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I. INTRODUCTION
Everyone has been talking about the Geneva Conventions. We talk about
them here and abroad-in academic, political, and social circles.' After
t Associate Professor of Law, Florida International University College of Law, J.D.,
Harvard Law School, B.A., U.C. Berkeley. I thank Erwin Chemerinsky, Anthony D'Amato,
Drew Dayes, Christopher Edley, Stanley Fish, Elizabeth Foley, Harold Koh, Leonard
Strickman, and Francisco Valdes for their influence on this work. I am also very grateful to
Jorge Esquirol for his indispensable guidance. Finally, I appreciate the diligent work of the
editors at the Arizona State Law Journal.
I. See Norman J. Finkel, Moral Monsters and Patriot Acts: Rights and Duties in the
Worst of Times, 12 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 242, 265 (2006) (noting criticism from
international press); see, e.g., Paisley Dodds, Senator: Many Detainees at Guantanamo Likely to
Be Sent Home, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD & 6NEWS, Jan. 25, 2002, available at
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2002/jan/25/senator-many_detainees/; John Mintz, On
Detainees, U.S. Faces Legal Quandary: Most Experts Say Al Qaeda Members Aren't POWs but
Taliban Fighters Might Be, WASH. POST, Jan. 27, 2002, at A22; Katharine Q. Seelye, The
ARIZONA STATE LAW JO URNAL
9/11, lines were swiftly drawn between those in favor of total executive
discretion and defenders of international standards of conduct. The Bush
Administration has been unwavering in its insistence that the Geneva
Conventions do not limit the President's options in conducting the war on
terror.2 Much of the international community and certainly human rights
organizations have held steadfast to their position that the United States
must comply with not only the letter but the "spirit" of the Geneva
Conventions.3 In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld4 and Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,5 the
Supreme Court became engaged in the debate when litigants called on it to
address the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to citizen and alien
terrorism detainees.6
Prominent scholars and even the Justices themselves have noted a trend
in the Supreme Court toward acceptance of international law and norms.
7
Recent decisions appear to vindicate the view that the Court is willing to
incorporate international standards into domestic jurisprudence.8 The
question examined in this Article is whether the Court's recent terrorism
detention decisions confirm statements, like Justice Ginsburg's, that the
Court's "'island' or 'lone ranger' mentality is beginning to change." 9 Hamdi
and Hamdan, both bold opinions in their own rights, definitively limit the
Prisoners: Rumsfeld Lists Outcomes for Detainees Held in Cuba, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2002, at
A10.
2. See infra notes 26-41 and accompanying text (discussing Bush's position on Geneva
Conventions).
3. See infra notes 42-59 and accompanying text (setting forth internationalist position).
4. 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
5. 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006).
6. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War art. 4, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T 3316,75 U.N.T.S 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention].
7. See, e.g., Roper v. Simons, 543 U.S. 551, 575 (2005) ("[T]he Court has referred to the
laws of other countries and to international authorities as instructive for its interpretation of the
Eighth Amendment[] .... ); Harlan Grant Cohen, Supremacy and Diplomacy: The International
Law of the U.S. Supreme Court, 24 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 273, 285-86 (2006); Mark Westin
Janis, The American Tradition of International Law: Exceptionalism and Universalism, 21
CONN. J. INT'L L. 211,212 (2006); John 0. McGinnis, Contemporary Foreign and International
Law in Constitutional Construction, 69 ALB. L. REV. 801, 801 (2006); Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Remarks for the American Constitution Society: Looking Beyond Our Borders: The
Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication 24 (Aug. 2, 2003), available
at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/us-law/inthecourts/Ginsburg-transcript-080203.pdf); cf
Jordan J. Paust, International Law Before the Supreme Court: A Mixed Record of Recognition,
45 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 829, 855 (2005) (addressing relevance of international law in recent
Supreme Court decisions and recognizing that international law was not primary basis of
holdings).
8. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 551.
9. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 24.
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President's power to detain and try enemy combatants."° They also discuss
the Geneva Conventions, and Hamdan even imposes Geneva-based
limitations on military tribunals."' Given the foregoing, many consider these
cases unequivocal victories of constitutional procedure and international
law over executive military discretion. 2 This Article takes a contrary view,
asserting the cases taken together are not truly "internationalist" because of
their failure to declare the Geneva Conventions self-executing.
The self-execution doctrine is a judicial invention'3 holding that a treaty
only provides judicially-enforceable rights if it "operates of itself' or if
Congress implements it through specific legislation. 4 The doctrine is quite
controversial and often considered patently isolationist because the
Constitution declares treaties the "supreme Law of the Land."' 5 Because of
modem anti-internationalist constructions of the doctrine, which have
turned the doctrine into an impenetrable barrier to treaty enforcement, no
duly ratified human rights treaty has been found self-executing. 6 As a
consequence, human rights treaties have been wholly unable to provide
judicial remedies to those suffering human rights abuses at the hands of the
U.S. government.
10. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786 (holding that military tribunals must comport with
Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ") and Geneva Conventions Common Article 3);
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 533 (2004) (holding that classification procedures must
comply with due process).
11. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786; see David Glazier, Full and Fair by What Measure?:
Identifying the International Law Regulating Military Commission Procedure, 24 B.U. INT'L
L.J. 55, 120 (2006) (noting the significance of these limitations).
12. Michael Ratner of the Center for Constitutional Rights called Hamdi "a major victory
for the rule of law." Fred Barbash, Supreme Court Backs Civil Liberties in Terror Cases,
WASHINGTONPOST.COM, June 28, 2004, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/Al1657-2004Jun28.html (quoting Ratner). Of Hamdan, one scholar exclaimed,
"Rarely has the Supreme Court handed a 'wartime' president a greater defeat, or human rights
defenders a greater victory." Martin S. Flaherty, More Real than Apparent: Separation of
Powers, the Rule of Law, and Comparative Executive "Creativity" in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
2005 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 51, 51; see also Harold Hongju Koh, Setting the World Right, 115
YALE L.J. 2350, 2352 (2006) (asserting that Hamdan has "finally begun the much-needed
process of turning the legal world right-side up again").
13. See Jordan J. Paust, Self-Executing Treaties, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 760, 766 (1988)
(characterizing self-execution doctrine as a judicial invention).
14. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
15. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.; see Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION 202 (2d ed. 1996) (1972) (asserting that the "recent practice" of
interpreting treaties as presumptively non-self-executing is "anti-Constitutional").
16. See Thomas Buergenthal, The Evolving International Human Rights System, 100 AM.
J. INT'L L. 783, 806 n.1 14 (2006). See generally Bert B. Lockwood Jr., The United Nations
Charter and United States Civil Rights Litigation: 1946-1955, 69 IOWA L. REV. 901 (1984)
(discussing court decisions that find human rights provisions of U.N. Charter non-self-
executing).
ARIZONA STATE LAW JOURNAL
The Hamdi and Hamdan cases gave the Court perfect opportunities to
declare the Geneva Conventions self-executing and push back the rising
tide of isolationism created by lower court skepticism of treaty law.1 7 In
both cases, terrorism detainees asserted rights under the Geneva
Conventions and urged the Court to hold the Conventions self-executing.
18
The Court did not do so, but rather utilized Geneva solely to interpret the
intent of Congress.19 In Hamdi, the Court used the Conventions to flesh out
legislative intent and find Congress authorized Hamdi's detention through a
joint resolution, the Authorization for Use of Military Force ("AUMF"),2 °
which is a sparse document devoid of any mention of detention.2' In
Hamdan, the Court held that certain Geneva Convention provisions were
silently incorporated by the Uniform Code of Military Justice ("UCMJ").22
While this placed the Conventions in a position to check executive power,
the Court scrupulously avoided the issue of self-execution.
Let me add a caveat here-the purpose of this Article is not to present
specific arguments against isolationism or American exceptionalism. That
has been done with great eloquence by others.23 Nor is my goal to defend a
due process model of the Guantdnamo detentions in the face of conservative
arguments regarding military necessity, which has also been done in great
detail elsewhere. 24 Rather, my less ambitious purpose is to unpack the
17. See infra Part III.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Passed just one week after 9/11, the Authorization for Use of Military Force
("AUMF") states in pertinent part, "[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and
appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned,
authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001."
Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
21. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 517 (2004) ("IT]he AUMF is explicit
congressional authorization for the detention of individuals in the narrow category we describe.
•... 11).
22. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2786 (2006); see also Uniform Code of
Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801-806(a) (1950).
23. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1479,
1480-87 (2003) (exposing "negative faces" of American exceptionalism); David Sloss, Non-
Self-Executing Treaties: Exposing a Constitutional Fallacy, 36 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1, 60-61
(2002) (asserting that current "cynical" approach to international law is contrary to United
States' national interests); cf Harlan Grant Cohen, The American Challenge to International
Law: A Tentative Framework for Debate, 28 YALE J. INT'L L. 551, 559 (2003) (maintaining that
internationalists should reframe defense of international law given American exceptionalist
philosophy).
24. See, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always
Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1019 (2003) (exploring models of extra-legal
government action during crises); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding
[Ariz. St. L.J.1020
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history and purported legal bases of the self-execution doctrine and
demonstrate how isolationist philosophy continues to influence the Supreme
Court's view of treaties, despite claims of the Court's burgeoning
intemationalism. 25 Accordingly, this Article adopts a definitively liberal
internationalist point of view but takes the atypical position that the
Supreme Court's approach to international law in the recent terrorism cases,
which incorporates treaty law only through legislative interpretation, should
cause concern to civil libertarians and internationalists alike.
Part I of the Article describes the Bush Administration-internationalist
debate, as a preface to the analysis of international law in Hamdi and
Hamdan. Part II examines the treatment of international law in Hamdi and
Hamdan and shows the extent of the Court's legal wrangling to avoid the
self-execution issue. Part III asserts that the purported presumption against
self-execution, which has been heavily cited by Geneva's detractors, is not a
product of Supreme Court jurisprudence but of lower court activism. Part
IV critiques the Court's choice to avoid the self-execution issue on the
grounds that it placed the Conventions in a tenuous position and silently
incorporated lower court hostility to treaty law.
II. FRAMING THE DEBATE: BUSH VS. INTERNATIONALISTS
The debate over the role of international law in the war on terror arose as
soon as the media began to report the detention of hundreds of captured
alleged Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters in Guantdinamo Bay. The Bush
Administration has been consistently clear in its opinion that it follows
international law "principles, 26 but the President is not substantively bound
by his international agreements. 27 Experts note that Bush's disrespect for
international law existed prior to the 9/11 attacks. He immediately
Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1308 (2002) (asserting necessity of
legislative involvement); Peter Margulies, Judging Terror in the "Zone of Twilight": Exigency,
Institutional Equity, and Procedure After September 11, 84 B.U. L. REV. 383, 429-30 (2004)
(arguing in favor of procedural rights for Guantunamo detainees).
25. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
26. Media Note No. 2005/994 from U.S. Dep't of State, Invitation to UN Special
Rapporteurs to Visit Guantanamo Bay Detention Facilities (Oct. 28, 2005),
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2005/55756.htm ("U.S. policy is to treat all detainees in
accordance with its international obligations and in a manner consistent with the principles of
the Third Geneva Convention."); Memorandum from President Bush on the Humane Treatment
of Al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., FINAL
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS app. C (2004)
[hereinafter 2002 Bush Memo], available at
http://wid.ap.org/documents/iraq/040824finalreport.pdf.
27. See infra notes 30-34.
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established "a new policy of 'a la carte multilateralism' . . . you pick and
choose the bits of international law you like and get rid of the rest., 28 The
Bush Administration's continuing contempt for international law is
evidenced by a Department of Defense statement opining, "Our strength as
a nation state will continue to be challenged by those who employ a strategy
of the weak using international fora, judicial processes, and terrorism.
29
The Administration asserts that the Geneva Conventions are not self-
executing,30 such that the only avenue of their enforcement is through
international political pressure. Alternatively, the Administration maintains
that even if the Conventions are self-executing and enforceable by private
individuals, the President is nonetheless free to violate them. The famous
"torture" memos by various presidential legal advisors make clear the
position that the President's commander in chief powers override any
conflicting treaty obligations.31 While the Administration insists that it does
not use torture in interrogation,32 President Bush has stated, "I accept the
28. Philippe Sands QC, Lawless World? The Bush Administration and Iraq: Issues of
International Legality and Criminality, 29 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 295, 300 (2006).
29. U.S. DEP'T. OF DEF., THE NATIONAL DEFENSE STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA 5 (Mar. 2005) http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds2.pdf
[hereinafter DEFENSE STATEMENT]. One scholar notes that this statement "can be read to plainly
place law and the implementation thereof by national and international legal institutions on a
continuum with terrorism as a peril-quite an astonishing position-instead of viewing law as
something that, if appropriately deployed, can itself imperil terrorism." Mark A. Drumbl,
Guantdnamo, Rasul, and the Twilight of Law, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 897, 917-18 (2005).
30. See, e.g., DEFENSE STATEMENT, supra note 29, at 19; see Koh, supra note 23, at 1500
(noting Bush's creation of "'rights-free' zones").
31. See U.S. DEPT OF DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN
THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 24 (2003); Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Ass't Att'y Gen.,
to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President 34 (Aug. 1, 2002) [hereinafter Bybee Memo],
http://www.washingtonpost.corm/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801 .pdf
(asserting that Commander-in-Chief power overrides any limitations imposed by Convention
Against Torture); Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Ass't Att'y Gen., and Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes H, General Counsel, Dept. of Def. 10-11
(Jan. 9, 2002) (emphasizing President's uncontestable Commander-in-Chief powers).
32. There is reason to be skeptical of this claim. First, Bush's legal advisors exempt a
good number of torture techniques from their definition of torture. See Bybee Memo, supra note
31, at 1 ("Physical pain amounting to torture must be equivalent in intensity to the pain
accompanying serious physical injury, such as organ failure, impairment of bodily function, or
even death."). In addition, the Administration fought efforts to prohibit intelligence officers
from using torture or inhumane treatment. See Douglas Jehl & David Johnston, White House
Fought New Curbs on Interrogations, Officials Say, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 13, 2005, at Al. David
Luban explains, "Indeed, given that lawyers at the highest levels of government continue to
loophole the laws against torture as energetically as ever ... the only reasonable inference to
draw is that the United States government is currently engaging in brutal and humiliating
interrogations." Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb, 91 VA. L. REV. 1425, 1461 (2005).
1022 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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legal conclusion of the Attorney General and the Department of Justice that
I have the authority under the Constitution to suspend Geneva as between
the United States and Afghanistan."33 Experts observe:
The "Bush position" boils down to this: even assuming that the
Geneva Conventions are binding on the United States as a matter
of international law, they do not bind the President as a matter of
domestic law because the President has the constitutional authority
to violate specific provisions of the Conventions to protect
national security.
34
Moreover, Bush has engaged in a "'hyper-technical legal analysis' to
exploit ambiguities" in the Geneva Conventions in order to "read out" the
war on terror.35 The Administration contends that the Conventions do not
apply to any of the Guantdnamo detainees, even Taliban fighters, for several
reasons. First, the Administration points to factual differences between the
war on terror and previous wars to explain the inapplicability of Geneva
law.36  Attorney General Alberto Gonzales infamously opined that
terrorism's "'new paradigm renders obsolete Geneva's strict limitations on
questioning of enemy prisoners and renders quaint some of its
provisions."'37 In addition, the Administration initially argued that because
the United States never recognized the Taliban as a legitimate government,
Taliban fighters were not subject to Geneva protections.38 Bowing to
international pressure, the Administration changed its position and admitted
that the Geneva Conventions should apply to the conflict between the
United States and the Taliban.39 Still, Bush asserted that Taliban detainees
at Guantdinamo were nonetheless disentitled to Prisoner of War status
33. 2002 Bush Memo, supra note 26, app C.
34. Derek Jinks & David Sloss, Is the President Bound by the Geneva Conventions?, 90
CORNELL L. REV. 97, 102 (2004).
35. Glazier, supra note 11, at 119 (quoting Geoffrey S. Corn, op-ed., When the Law of
War Becomes Over-lawyered, JURIST, Nov. 25, 2005, available at
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2005/1 I/when-law-of-war-becomes-over-lawyered.php.
36. See Press Briefing by Ari Fleischer, Press Sec'y, White House Office of the Press
Sec'y (Jan. 28, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/01/20020128-11 .html
[hereinafter January 2002 Press Briefing] (stating that Geneva Convention was "written in a
very different era, following world war").
37. John Barry, Michael Hirsh & Michael Isikoff, The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK INT'L,
May 24, 2004, available at http://www.thereitis.org/displayarticle269.html (quoting Jan. 25,
2002 memo from Gonzales to Bush).
38. See January 2002 Press Briefing, supra note 36.
39. See Statement by Ari Fleischer, Press Sec'y, White House Office of the Press Sec'y,
(May 7, 2003), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releasesf2003/05/20030507-18.html
[hereinafter May 2003 Press Statement].
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because of their failure to wear uniforms and complicity with Al Qaeda.40
Furthermore, Bush was unwavering on his position that Al Qaeda members
detained pursuant to the larger "war" on terror are not entitled to Geneva
41protections.
By contrast, internationalists hold that the Guantdinamo detentions are
subject to the limits set forth in treaty-based and customary international
law. Internationalists assert that to the extent that detentions and trials are
occurring in the military context, the international law of war substantively
apply.42 Derek Jinks and David Sloss, for example, reject the claim that the
President possesses emergency power to override valid treaty obligations.43
They recognize various powers retained by the Executive to terminate a
treaty by its terms or in the event of a breach, but assert that as a general
rule, the President is bound by the Constitution to execute treaties because,
40. See id. (stating that Taliban detainees are not POWs because they do not wear
uniforms and violate laws of war); see also January 2002 Press Briefing, supra note 36. Bush's
assertion that Guantdnamo detainees are not POWs is apparently based on the conclusion that
they do not meet criteria set forth in Third Geneva Convention Article 4(a)(2). Under Article 4
the following persons, among others, qualify as prisoner of war:
1. Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed
forces.
2. Members of other militias [that] ... fulfill the following conditions:
(a) That of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance;
(c) That of carrying arms openly;
(d) That of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws and
customs of war.
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(a)(2).
41. The argument proceeds on two bases. First, the Geneva Conventions only apply to
signatory nations, and Al Qaeda is not a signatory. See May 2003 Press Statement, supra note
39. Second, Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which does not contain a signatory
limitation, does not apply to the conflict with Al Qaeda because it only applies to domestic
conflicts and the war on terror is of international scope. See 2002 Bush Memo, supra note 26;
Bybee Memo, supra note 31.
42. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich, The Taliban, Al Qaeda, and the Determination of Illegal
Combatants, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 891 (2002); Jinks & Sloss, supra note 34, at 102; Vincent-Joel
Proulx, If the Hat Fits, Wear It, If the Turban Fits, Run for Your Life: Reflections on the
Indefinite Detention and Targeted Killing of Suspected Terrorists, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 801 (2005);
Luisa Vierucci, Prisoners of War or Protected Persons Qua Unlawful Combatants? The
Judicial Safeguards to Which Guantdnamo Bay Detainees Are Entitled, 1 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST.
284, 291 (2003).
43. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 34, at 106 ("[T]he President never possesses the unilateral
authority to violate a treaty; he must always obtain congressional approval.").
1024 [Ariz. St. L.J.
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under the Supremacy Clause, they are "the supreme Law of the Land,"' and
the President must "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.
4 5
According to internationalists, most portions of the Geneva Conventions
are self-executing. They observe that there is no evidence that Geneva's
drafters intended the Conventions to be non-self-executing 46 and note that
the majority of Geneva's articles contain mandatory language about
protecting individual rights.47 Scholars also argue that the Conventions have
been "executed" in the sense that Congress has specifically implemented
them.48 They further assert that Geneva rights may be enforced through the
habeas corpus statute,49 Torture Victim Protection Act,50 or other legal
mechanisms.5
Moreover, internationalists tend to read the Geneva Conventions far
more broadly than the Bush Administration. They reject that the
Administration is entitled to make a blanket determination that Guantinamo
detainees are not covered by the Conventions. 52 They assert that there are
many colorable arguments in favor or treating Guantdinamo detainees as
prisoners of war. They contend that Taliban fighters could qualify for POW
status under Article 4(A)(1) by virtue of their being "[m]embers of the
armed forces of a Party to the conflict."53 This would make their failure to
44. Id. at 104 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
45. Id. at 107 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3); see also Michael D. Ramsey, Torturing
Executive Power, 93 GEO. L.J. 1213, 1234 (2005) (stating that President must execute treaties as
laws of the land).
46. Jinks & Sloss, supra note 34, at 123-24. The intent inquiry, however, is itself
problematic. See infra notes 238-46 and accompanying text.
47. See Jordan J. Paust, Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons
Detained Without Trial, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 503, 515 (2003) ("Federal courts have repeatedly
held that a treaty need only expressly or impliedly provide an individual right for it to be self-
enforcing.").
48. See Brief of Amici Curiae Int'l Law Professors Listed Herein in Support of Petitioner
at *9, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006), (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 42058 (stating that
the Geneva Conventions are executed by congressional legislation such as 10 U.S.C. §§ 818,
821 (2006) and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006)).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
50. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006) (creating cause of action for aliens to sue in U.S. court for
"tort[s] ... committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States"); see
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484-85 (2004) (indicating that Guantdnamo detainees could
vindicate Geneva claims via Alien Torts Statute).
51. See Carlos M. Vizquez, Treaty-Based Rights and Remedies of Individuals, 92 COLUM.
L. REV. 1082, 1143 (1992) (treaty rights may be invoked defensively).
52. See, e.g., Aldrich, supra note 42, at 897 (criticizing "the blanket nature of the decision
to deny POW status to the Taliban prisoners"); Allison Marston Danner, Beyond the Geneva
Conventions: Lessons from the Tokyo Tribunal in Prosecuting War and Terrorism, 46 VA. J.
INT'L L. 83, 103 (2005) (asserting that blanket determination is "the most illuminating example
of the Administration's disregard of the jus in bello").
53. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 4(A)(1).
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wear uniforms irrelevant because that provision is only a requirement for
militia and resistance movements not part of regular armed forces.54 In
addition, international scholars consistently emphasize the portions of the
Geneva Conventions requiring detainees to be presumptively considered
prisoners of war until their status can be determined by a competent
tribunal.55
There are also arguments against the Bush Administration's unequivocal
claim that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to Al Qaeda because Al
Qaeda is a nonstate actor and not a party to Geneva. Regarding Al Qaeda
operatives captured in Afghanistan, some assert that, like Taliban detainees,
Al Qaeda members can be considered members of armed forces of, or
regularized militia supporting, a party to the conflict.56 Others maintain
broadly that Al Qaeda members should be protected under the penumbral
umbrella of the Third Geneva Convention's "spirit., 57 As to Al Qaeda
members captured in the general "war" on terror, internationalists maintain
that Geneva Common Article 3 provides rights to detainees in any armed
conflict involving a signatory. 58 Finally, internationalists maintain that it is
philosophically untenable for the United States to try Al Qaeda members for
54. Id. art. 4(A)(2); see Aldrich, supra note 42, at 895 (asserting that Taliban fighters can
be considered members of armed forces despite non-compliance with Article 4(A)(2)'s
requirements); Lawrence Azubuike, Status of Taliban and Al Qaeda Soldiers: Another
Viewpoint, 19 CONN. J. INT'L L. 127, 146 (2003) (maintaining that Article 4(A)(1)'s only
inquiry is "whether the person is a member of the armed forces of the state"); Proulx, supra note
42, at 843 (asserting that because Taliban was the "controlling socio-political entity throughout
most of Afghanistan[,]" Taliban fighters are members of a party to conflict's armed forces). But
see Glazier, supra note 11, at 82-83; Ruth Wedgwood, Al Qaeda, Terrorism, and Military
Commissions, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 328, 335 (2002) (asserting that Article 4(A)(1) implicitly
incorporates requirements of Article 4(A)(2)).
55. See, e.g., Proulx, supra note 42, at 845. Third Geneva Convention Article 5 states,
"Should any doubt arise as to whether persons.., belong to any of the categories enumerated in
Article 4, such persons shall enjoy the protection of the present Convention until such time as
their status has been determined by a competent tribunal." Third Geneva Convention, supra
note 6, art. 5.
56. See, e.g., Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva Conventions to the "Global
War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 182 (2005) (stating that if Al Qaeda fought
alongside Taliban, they could be considered POWs); Vierucci, supra note 42, at 291
(contending that Al Qaeda units may have been under control of Taliban and therefore entitled
to Article 4(A)(1) protection); Joseph Blocher, Comment, Combatant Status Review Tribunals:
Flawed Answers to the Wrong Question, 116 YALE L.J. 667, 672 (2006) (arguing that Al Qaeda
groups could qualify for POW status as "armed forces" under Article 4(A)(1)).
57. See, e.g., Azubuike, supra note 54, at 153.
58. See Jinks, supra note 56, at 188-89 (asserting that Common Article 3 is not limited to
internal civil wars); Jinks & Sloss, supra note 34, at 116 n.87 (criticizing Bush Administration's
interpretation of Common Article 3); Neal Kumar Katyal, Comment, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The
Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 110 (2006) (observing "[t]he expertise
deficit ran particularly deep in the Administration's interpretation of Common Article 3").
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violations of the international law of war while simultaneously holding that
America is not bound by that law.59
The Supreme Court was thrust into the debate over the legality of the
terrorism detentions in Hamdi and Hamdan. While many rejoice at the
apparent limits it set on executive discretion, this jubilation rings hollow to
the many individuals who continue to be detained, tortured, and subject to
military (in)justice. One of the reasons why the Supreme Court's decisions
in Hamdi and Hamdan seem more bark than bite is the Court did not give
the Geneva Conventions the substantive recognition they are due, an action
that might have proved the detainees' only saving grace.
III. FEAR OF SELF-EXECUTION IN HAMDI AND HAMDAN
Bush's stance toward international law has received worldwide
criticism. 60 The Administration's policies are often considered a brazen
flouting of international law in furtherance of a larger American
exceptionalist policy.61 To much of the world, the United States is a country
governed by the law of a ruler rather than the rule of law.62 In the terrorism
cases, the Supreme Court had a unique chance to signal to the world
community that the United States abides by neutral international rules, even
if contrary to the President's wishes.63 The Court, however, did not fully
59. See MARGARET MACMILLAN, PEACEMAKERS: THE PARIS CONFERENCE OF 1919 AND
ITS ATTEMPT TO END WAR 22 (2001) ("American exceptionalism has always had two sides: the
one eager to set the world to rights, the other ready to turn its back with contempt if its message
should be ignored."); Sands QC, supra note 28, at 300 (describing Bush's "a la carte
multilateralism").
60. See, e.g., Finkel, supra note 1, at 267; Ramsey, supra note 45, at 1213 (noting the
"sound and fury" directed at memos from Bush's advisors that support broad views of
Presidential war power); J.M. Spectar, Beyond the Rubicon: Presidential Leadership,
International Law & the Use of Force in the Long Hard Slog, 22 CONN. J. INT'L L. 47, 117
(2006) (observing nongovernmental organizations' criticism of Bush's policies).
61. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Mark Janis and the American Tradition of International
Law, 21 CONN. J. INT'L L. 191, 195 (2006) (asserting that America's commitment to
"[u]niversalism in human rights has been replaced by a human rights policy" of lawlessness).
62. See David Cole, The Idea of Humanity: Human Rights and Immigrants' Rights, 37
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 627, 653 (2006) (noting that Bush's policies are "widely viewed as
a blatant disregard of basic principles of the laws of war and human rights law"). See, e.g.,
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Remarks at the Investiture of Eric M. Freedman as the Maurice A.
Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, November 22, 2004, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV.
403, 415 (2004) (asserting that "dumb fiasco" of Guantanamo has created "world-wide outcry
of repugnance for this cowboy adventure into totalitarianism").
63. It would thereby quell the criticism that the United States' perceived violations of
Geneva has engendered. See AMNESTY INT'L, AMERICAS: REGIONAL OVERVIEW 2004 (2005),
http://web.amnesty.org/web/web.nsf/print/36F832815378BDCCCI 256FDB003713A4
(condemning United States for failing to apply Conventions to detainees).
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embrace this opportunity, and thus Hamdi and Hamdan are not examples of
the Court's new internationalism. In Hamdi, the Court used international
law to expand the President's powers and approve citizen detention, leaving
Hamdi's only relief to come from the Due Process clause. 64 In Hamdan, the
Court actually imposed Geneva-based limits on the President,65 over the
heated objections of the government, but it took an extremely circuitous
route to do so, precisely to avoid the issue of self-execution.
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, at first blush, is not a case at all concerned with
international law. The holding, requiring basic due process under Mathews
v. Eldridge6 6 in the proceedings to classify citizens alleged to be enemy
combatants, seems uniquely domestic.67 Upon further analysis, however,
international law, incorporated amorphously into the "universal agreement
and practice" of war, played a role in the Court's holding. 68 The Court
looked to international law, not as a limit on U.S. military action, but rather
as a tool of statutory interpretation with the result of enhancing executive
power.
According to the government, Yaser Hamdi was taken into U.S. custody
in an apparent combat zone during ongoing hostilities with Afghanistan.69
Of course, Hamdi's advocates assert that he was in fact a noncombatant
who was unlawfully captured by the Northern Alliance and turned over to
American forces.70 In June 2002, Hamdi's father filed a habeas corpus
petition in U.S. district court asserting that Hamdi's detention was in
violation of the laws and treaties of United States.7 The district court found
64. See infra notes 95-96 and accompanying text.
65. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796-97 (2006) (finding that Common Article
3 of the Third Geneva Convention rendered illegal Hamdan's military commission). See infra
notes 135-41 and accompanying text (discussing this conclusion).
66. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
67. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 528-29 (2004) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
68. Id. at 518 (citing Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30 (1942)).
69. Hamdi was turned over to U.S forces by members of the Northern Alliance. Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 243 F. Supp. 2d 527, 529 (E.D. Va. 2002).
70. Hamdi's contention appears to be vindicated by the actions of the Bush
Administration. The Bush Administration released Hamdi in exchange for his renunciation of
U.S. citizenship and promise to stay in Saudi Arabia for five years. See Saudi-American
Released to Riyadh, BBC NEWS, October 11, 2004, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/3733942.stm. The United States almost certainly would not
have taken this course of action had there been any evidence that Hamdi engaged in active
combat against U.S. forces.
71. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 511. This came after some initial legal wrangling. See Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 283 (4th Cir. 2002).
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Hamdi's detention unlawful because the sparse "Mobbs Declaration,' a
conclusory nine paragraph document by Defense Department employee
Michael H. Mobbs offered by the government as justification for Hamdi's
classification as an unlawful enemy combatant, fell "far short of even
minimal criteria for judicial review. 73 The Fourth Circuit reversed, holding
that the military's treatment of Hamdi was constitutional and legal.74
Examining the Mobbs Declaration, the court of appeals opined that "Hamdi
was indisputably seized in an active combat zone" and this fact alone was
sufficient to establish President Bush had exercised legitimate war power.75
As to Hamdi's international law arguments, the court of appeals dismissed
out of hand the claim that the Third Geneva Convention provided Hamdi
any enforceable rights.76
Quizzically, the Fourth Circuit asserted that even if Geneva rights were
judicially cognizable, Hamdi's claim that he is a prisoner of war is "a
distinction without a difference" because unlawful combatants are "subject
to mere detention in precisely the same way that lawful prisoners of war
are." 77 This argument misses the mark because, in fact, the Geneva
Conventions talk as much about the conditions of detention as the right to
release upon cessation of hostilities.78 Thus, if the Geneva Conventions did
apply to Hamdi and are judicially enforceable, the court had the obligation
to terminate Hamdi's detention or alter the conditions of his detention to
comply with Geneva.79
On June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court issued an opinion reversing and
remanding Hamdi's case.8" The plurality opinion, authored by Justice
O'Connor, holds that the government has the authority to detain U.S.
citizens as enemy combatants, but that detainees retain the right to
challenge the bases for such classifications in proceedings governed by due
72. Hamdi, 243 F. Supp. 2d at 533. The government asserted the Mobbs Declaration,
standing alone, provided sufficient bases for Hamdi's classification. Id. at 532.
73. Id. at 532-33.
74. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003). The Fourth Circuit ruled that
the AUMF constituted specific congressional authorization of citizen detention. Id. at 467. The
only role for judicial review was to determine whether the President had acted "pursuant to [his]
war powers." Id. at 459.
75. Id. at 473.
76. Id. at 468 ("[T]he Geneva Convention is not self-executing.").
77. Id. at 469.
78. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, arts. 13, 15, 18, 22, 25-3 1.
79. The government, for two years, had not been treating Hamdi as a prisoner of war, nor
did they state an intention to do so at any time in the future. See Aya Gruber, Raising the Red
Flag: The Continued Relevance of the Japanese Internment in the Post-Hamdi World, 54 U.
KAN. L. REV. 307, 392 (2006) (stating that Hamdi approved of treating war detainees like
criminals).
80. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
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process." The Court rejected the Fourth Circuit's formulation of minimal
judicial review and instead endorsed a fuller process of individualized
review under the Fifth Amendment."
The fist substantive issue addressed by the Court was the scope of the
government's detention authority. Sidestepping the issue of executive
unilateralism, the Court held that Congress had authorized Hamdi's
detention and together the branches possessed authority to detain him
militarily.83 To find congressional authorization, the Court relied solely on
the sparse AUMF, which only sanctions the general use of military force
against those responsible for 9/11.84 Acknowledging that the AUMF says
nothing about detention, the Court reasoned that because of the universality
of the "law of war," which includes the detention of fighters, Congress must
have intended the President to have the power to detain U.S. citizen enemy
combatants when it authorized the use of "necessary and appropriate force"
against those associated with 9/1 L85
This is the place where international law played a part in the Court's
analysis. In fleshing out the laws and usages of war, the Court mentioned
several legal treatises and the Geneva and Hague Conventions to support
the proposition that the universal law of war dictates that warring powers
have the authority to detain enemies for the duration of the conflict.8 6 This
imputed knowledge of the "law of war" was the only interpretive technique
the Court used to determine congressional intent.87 In short, the Court held
that because Congress authorized military action, it must have assumed that
action could be as broad in scope as permitted by customs and laws of war,
including the exercise of military detention.88 Although the plurality took
pains to explain how the customs of war enhance a President's detention
power, it did not consider whether that same law places limitations on that
81. Id. at 509.
82. Id. at 537-38.
83. Id. at519-20.
84. Id. at 518 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115
Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006)).
85. Id. at 519 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, 115 Stat. 224).
86. Id. at 520-21.
87. The Court did not examine the legislative history of the AUMF or explain why it is
unequivocally clear that "appropriate force" always includes the military detention of citizens.
See id. at 518.
88. Id. at 519 ("Because detention to prevent a combatant's return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war, in permitting the use of 'necessary and appropriate force,'
Congress has clearly and unmistakably authorized detention in the narrow circumstances
considered here.").
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power,89 other than the limitation that detention end when conflict ends. 90
Thus, the Court relegated the Geneva Conventions to a set of amorphous
principles to be relied on whenever the President seeks war powers, while
ignored and violated in other respects.
Justice Souter lodged this precise criticism against the plurality
opinion.9' He argued that if Hamdi's detention is only authorized as part of
the customs and laws of war, it must accordingly comport with the
requirements of the Geneva Conventions.9" By holding Hamdi
incommunicado and failing to give him a status hearing in front of a
competent tribunal, the government was not in compliance.93 As a
consequence, Hamdi's detention was not lawful under the universal laws of
war. Justice Souter stated, "[T]here is reason to question whether the United
States is acting in accordance with the laws of war it claims as authority." 94
After finding that the AUMF authorized Hamdi's detention, the plurality
determined Hamdi could challenge the President's determination of his
enemy combatant status and articulated a process to govern such a
challenge.95 The Court determined that due process requires the government
to give an alleged enemy combatant notice of the factual basis for his
classification and opportunity to rebut the government's factual claims in
front of a neutral decision-maker.96 Because of administrative burdens,
however, the government would enjoy a rebuttable presumption of accuracy
in the classification 97 and the ability to rely on hearsay evidence.98 Having
thus determined the process due to Hamdi, the Court simply dismissed his
substantive Geneva claims, stating "we need not address at this time
89. See id. at 534 n.2 (explicitly avoiding a substantive construction of Geneva
Conventions).
90. Id. at 520 (observing "that detention may last no longer than active hostilities"). The
Court acknowledged that certain factual circumstances might test the limit of what constitutes a
continuing state of war, but nonetheless concluded "that is not the situation we face as of this
date." Id. at 521-22.
91. He contended that the detention was unauthorized by Congress but concurred for
practical reasons. Id. at 549-50 (Souter, J., concurring).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 551.
95. Id. at 536-39 (plurality opinion).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 533-34. The Court did not mention to what standard the detainee must disprove
the government's allegations. Id. at 534.
98. Id. at 533-34. Further the government could establish its case with information as
sparse as that contained in the Mobbs Declaration. Id.; see Gruber, supra note 79, at 356 n.313
(noting that serious questions of procedure remain to be resolved).
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whether any treaty guarantees him similar access to a tribunal for a
determination of his status." 99
Unfortunately, the plurality never endeavored to show the process they
outlined is commensurate with the minimal procedural requirements of the
Geneva Conventions. l00 Moreover, even if the process outlined by the
plurality would amount to a status determination by a "competent tribunal,"
as required by Geneva Article 5, the Court simply ignored Hamdi's claim
that the manner of his continued detention violated the Conventions.0 1 The
Supreme Court Hamdi opinion thus demonstrates the extent to which the
Court fears the Geneva Conventions. 102 More than merely avoiding the self-
execution issue, the Court seemed to avoid any meaningful analysis of
Geneva, even when doing so appeared vital to its interpretation of the
AUMF.
B. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld
The Hamdan case does not present as bleak a picture to internationalists
because the Geneva Conventions operated, not to justify President Bush's
actions, but to restrain them. Unfortunately, the Court continued to place the
Conventions in a subordinate legal role by failing to declare them self-
executing. Far from embracing the opportunity to affirm the applicability of
international conventions to the war on terror, the Court went to great
lengths to avoid any substantive decision making, instead back-dooring
international law into the case as implicit congressional intent.
Salim Hamdan is the Guantdnamo detainee popularly known as Osama
bin Laden's chauffeur. 10 3 He was captured during the initial military
invasion of Afghanistan and transferred to Guantdnamo Bay. On July 3,
2003, the President announced that Hamdan and five other Guantdnamo
detainees were subject to trial by military tribunal." 4 On July 4, 2004,
subsequent to Hamdan's filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus, the
99. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 534 n.2.
100. The Fourth Circuit had grappled with this issue briefly. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d.
450, 469 (4th Cir. 2003).
101. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507. Hamdi had argued that "his prolonged indefinite solitary
confinement" violated Geneva Convention article 5. Brief for Petitioners at *17, Hamdi v.
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 378715.
102. See Jinks & Sloss, supra note 34, at 101 (noting that Hamdi failed to answer "crucial"
question of whether Geneva regulated President's conduct of warfare); Laura E. Little,
Transnational Guidance in Terrorism Cases, 38 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 1, 11 (2006) (calling
Hamdi's avoidance of Geneva Conventions "remarkable").
103. See, e.g., Charles Lane, Court Case Challenges Power of President, WASH. POST,
Mar. 26, 2006, at Al (describing Hamdan as bin Laden's personal chauffeur).
104. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2760 (2006).
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government finally charged him with conspiracy.' °5 The government set
forth various overt acts in support of the conspiracy charge, including being
Osama bin Laden's driver and bodyguard, transporting weapons to Al
Qaeda members, driving bin Laden to training camps, and receiving
weapons training. 106
On November 8, 2004, the district court ruled that Hamdan's military
trial was invalid as unauthorized by Congress.' °7 The court held the UCMJ
requires military tribunals to comport with the "law of war," including
applicable provisions of the Third Geneva Convention.0 8 The court found
Hamdan's commission violated Article 102 of the Third Geneva
Convention, which requires POWs to be tried like soldiers, and Common
Article 3, which requires trial by "a regularly constituted court affording all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples."'0 9  The district court asserted not only that the Geneva
Conventions apply through the UCMJ, but also that the treaty provides
substantive rights because it is self-executing. " 0 The court reasoned:
Because the Geneva Conventions were written to protect
individuals, because the Executive Branch of our government has
implemented the Geneva Conventions for fifty years without
questioning the absence of implementing legislation, because
Congress clearly understood that the Conventions did not require
implementing legislation except in a few specific areas, and
because nothing in the Third Geneva Convention itself manifests
the contracting parties' intention that it not become effective as
domestic law without the enactment of implementing legislation, I
conclude that, insofar as it is pertinent here, the Third Geneva
Convention is a self-executing treaty."'
105. Id. at 2760-61; see Charging Document, United States v. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006) (No. 05-184) [hereinafter Hamdan Charging Document], available at
http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jul2004/d20040714hcc.pdf.
106. Hamdan, 126 S.Ct. at 2761; see Hamdan Charging Document, supra note 105. On
July 7, 2004, the Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CSRT) issued its determination that
Hamdan's detention at Guantdnamo Bay was proper because he was an "enemy combatant."
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2761.
107. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 158-59 (D.D.C. 2004).
108. Id. at 159-63. The district court's holding that the President cannot act in
contravention of congressional dictates finds support in the legal framework set forth in Justice
Jackson's concurrence in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
109. Hamdan, 344 F. Supp. 2d at 159-63 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6,
arts. 3, 102).
110. Id. at 165.
111. Id.
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The D.C. Circuit reversed, holding that Hamdan's commission was a
valid exercise of war power by the political branches." 2 As to Hamdan's
Geneva claims, the D.C. Circuit construed the Geneva Conventions as
presumptively non-self-executing and enforceable exclusively through
international mechanisms." 3 The court of appeals moreover held that
Geneva rights, even if generally enforceable, would not apply to Hamdan
because Al Qaeda is not a "High Contracting Party" and Hamdan does not
qualify as a prisoner of war." 4 The court of appeals further deferred to the
President's conclusion that Common Article 3 is inapplicable because the
war against Al Qaeda is "international."
'" 15
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether the military
tribunal had authority to try Hamdan and whether Hamdan could invoke
Geneva Convention protections." 6 The Court eventually invalidated
Hamdan's tribunal as an unlawful exercise of military discretion, in
violation of domestic statutory law and the Geneva Conventions." 7 While
the Court might have come to this conclusion by finding the tribunals
unauthorized by Congress" i8 or contrary to a self-executing treaty, the Court
elected to follow a very circuitous route to invalidate the tribunals. The
Court chose to avoid both the executive unilateralism and self-execution
issues and was able to reach its desired conclusion through statutory
interpretation.' 19 However, its legislative interpretation is fraught with
problems, illustrating the extent of the Court's fear of the self-execution
issue.
112. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 37-38 (D.C. Cir. 2005). In analyzing the AUMF,
the court of appeals relied on Hamdi for the proposition that there is no difference between the
AUMF and a formal declaration of war. Thus, the AUMF triggered presidential power to
convene military commissions. Id.
113. Id. at39.
114. Id. at 40-41.
115. Id. at 41-42. ("The second type of conflict covered by Common Article 3 is a civil
war-that is, an 'armed conflict not of an international character occurring in the territory of one
of the High Contracting Parties ... ').
116. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2762 (2006). While the case was pending,
Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd, 2000dd-1 (2006)), which sought to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction over detainee claims. The Court construed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005
("DTA") in such a way as to preserve Supreme Court jurisdiction over Hamdan's case.
Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2763-69.
117. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780-97.
118. The Court would have had to tackle the executive unilateralism issue-an issue it
sought to avoid. See id. at 2774.
119. See Curtis A. Bradley, Jack L. Goldsmith, & David H. Moore, Sosa, Customary
International Law, and the Continuing Relevance of Erie, 120 HARV. L. REV. 869, 931 (2007)
(observing that Hamdan is illustrative of the "need for courts to find congressional authorization
to apply international law to the war on terrorism").
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The Court's first move was to hold that Congress had approved the use
of military tribunals generally through UCMJ Article 21 and the AUMF.1
20
UCMJ Article 21 (formerly Article 15 of the Articles of War) reads:
The provisions of this chapter conferring jurisdiction upon courts-
martial do not deprive military commissions, provost courts, or
other military tribunals of concurrent jurisdiction with respect to
offenders or offenses that by statute or by the law of war may be
tried by military commissions, provost courts, or other military
tribunals. 121
Although the Court's interpretation of Article 21 as an express
congressional authorization finds support from the World War II case Ex
parte Quirin,121 the majority of experts maintain that Article 21 simply
seeks to preserve the President's "common law" power rather than provide
express authority for tribunals.22 Nonetheless, the plurality dismisses any
alternate interpretation of Article 21, declining to "revisit Quirin's
controversial characterization of Article of War 15 as congressional
authorization for military commissions."
12 4
The Court's reliance on the AUMF is also problematic, as the Court
never explains why military adjudication is "necessary and appropriate" to
the prosecution of war in the way, according to Hamdi, military detention
is. Rather the Court concludes summarily that "the AUMF activated the
President's war powers . . . [which] include authority to convene military
commissions in appropriate circumstances."'' 25 A better route may have been
for the Court to find express congressional authorization through the 2005
Detainee Treatment Act ("DTA"), which sets forth specific review
120. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774.
121. 10 U.S.C. § 821, art. 21 (2006).
122. 317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942).
123. See David Stoelting, Military Commissions and Terrorism, 31 DENV. J. INT'L L. &
POL'Y 427, 429 (2003) (asserting that Article 21 "simply preserves the well-established
jurisdiction of military commissions over crimes as established by statute or by the laws of
war"). General Crowder, the drafter of Article 15, testified to the Senate that the article "just
saves to these war courts the jurisdiction they now have and makes it a concurrent jurisdiction
with courts-martial." S. REP. No. 64-130, at 40-41 (1916) (testimony of General Crowder).
Scott Silliman explains that "[t]he word 'recognized' is key to an accurate understanding [of
Article 21] because it implies only acknowledgment, not establishment." Scott L. Silliman, On
Military Commissions, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 529, 535 (2004).
124. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2774.
125. Id. at 2775.
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procedures for military commissions decisions. 2 6 The Court did not do so
for reasons I will discuss in more detail later in this Article.
12 7
It is therefore clear that the Court was willing to permit the President to
convene terrorism military commissions under appropriate circumstances. 
28
It is equally apparent, however, that the Court intended to place meaningful
limits, including international law limits, on that power. 129 The Court
engaged in a careful analysis of the Geneva Conventions to find that
Hamdan's military commission violated Common Article 3.13° The principal
argument by the government was that the Geneva Conventions generally do
not apply to Hamdan because they only govern conflicts between
signatories, and Hamdan was captured pursuant to the conflict with Al
Qaeda, a non-signatory.'13 Of course, Hamdan had argued and the district
court agreed, that Hamdan was entitled to Geneva protections as a person
captured during the conflict with Afghanistan. 132 The district court observed
that Geneva rights "are triggered by the place of the conflict, and not by
what particular faction a fighter is associated with."' 33 Additionally, the
district court held that Hamdan should be treated as a prisoner of war until
classified otherwise by a competent tribunal.
34
The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to determine whether the
Conventions generally applied to Hamdan, because it held that Common
Article 3, which provides basic rights to war captives, was sufficient to
render Hamdan's trial illegal. 35 Although Common Article 3 is inapplicable
to "international" conflicts, 136 the Court reasoned that "[t]he term 'conflict
not of an international character' is used here in contradistinction to a
conflict between nations."' 37 Common Article 3 accordingly applies to
126. See Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2743-44
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000dd, 2000dd- 1 (2006)).
127. See infra notes 158-61 and accompanying text.
128. See Peter J. Spiro, International Decisions: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 100 AM. J. INT'L L.
888, 892 (2006) (observing that Hamdan decision did not "foreclose the legislative revival of
the tribunals").
129. The Court stated, "[t]ogether, the UCMJ, the AUMF, and the DTA at most
acknowledge a general Presidential authority to convene military commissions in circumstances
where justified under the Constitution and laws, including the law of war." Hamdan, 126 S. Ct.
at 2775.
130. See id. at 2795-97.
131. See id. at 2795 (noting government's argument).
132. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 344 F. Supp. 2d 152, 161 (D.D.C. 2004).
133. Id.
134. Id. at 162.
135. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2795-96.
136. The court of appeals had read this to exempt the "international" conflict with Al
Qaeda. Id. at 2795 (citing Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 41 (D.C. Cir. 2005)).
137. Id.
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conflicts that are not classic clashes of nations while the rest of the
Conventions apply to conflicts between signatory nations.'38 The Court thus
adopted a plainly internationalist position, rejecting a well-known
interpretation, and one urged by the President, that Common Article 3 only
applies to internal conflicts. 139 Applying Common Article 3 to Hamdan's
tribunal, the Court ruled that although "Common Article 3 obviously
tolerates a great degree of flexibility,"' 140 Hamdan's commission violated the
provision because its deviation from regular court martial procedures
rendered it an irregular court, and the lack of practical bases for the
deviation violated Common Article 3's requirement to incorporate "all the
judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples."''
Evidently, the Court believed President Bush's military commission
procedures violated international law and correspondingly struck them
down. How was the Court able to do this without holding the Geneva
Conventions self-executing? The Court found a way to avoid the self-
execution issue by again engaging in a questionable interpretation of the
UCMJ. The Court observed that Article 21's authorization is not
unconditional, but contains the limitation that military tribunals comport
with the "law of war."'' 42 The Court characterized this limitation as binding,
stating that the President "may not disregard limitations that Congress has,
in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers."' 143 In turn,
the Court defined the law of war by reference to the American common law
experience'" and international treaties, principally the Geneva
Conventions. 145 In this manner the Court was able to incorporate Geneva
138. See id. at 2796.
139. See supra note 58 and accompanying text (contrasting President's view of Common
Article 3 with internationalist views); see also Curtis A. Bradley, International Decisions:
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 882, 886 (2006) (citing Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at
2795-96 and noting that the Court "did not give much deference to a contrary interpretation by
the executive branch").
140. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2798.
141. Id. at 2796-98 (quoting Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 3, I(d)).
142. Id. at 2786 ("The UCMJ conditions the President's use of military commissions on
compliance ... with the 'rules and precepts of the law of nations."') (quoting Ex Parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 28 (1942)).
143. Id. at 2774 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)).
144. On this front, the Court concludes that the President exceeded common law limitations
because Hamdan's charge of conspiracy, while certainly a crime under domestic law, is not an
offense cognizable under the laws of war. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2780-81. The Court also
finds a lack of common law authority to try Hamdan because his conspiratorial acts predated the
9/11 attacks and thus did not occur in a "theater of war." See id. at 2777-78.
145. See id. at 2794.
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protections into its holding and simultaneously avoid the self-execution
issue. The Court concluded, "[R]egardless of the nature of the [Geneva
Convention] rights conferred on Hamdan, they are, as the Government does
not dispute, part of the law of war. And compliance with the law of war is
the condition upon which the authority set forth in Article 21 is granted."
1 46
Reading Article 21 as requiring military tribunal procedures to comply
with the international law of war is problematic on many levels. First, if
Article 21 was only meant to recognize existing common law jurisdiction
for military tribunals, it was never intended to operate as a substantive
limitation on the President's authority. 47 Moreover, even if Article 21 is
properly interpreted as a substantive limitation rather than a descriptive
recognition, the only limitation that readily appears from the text regards
which offenses may be tried-only statutory or law of war offenses may be
tried.148 Indeed, the Court provides no historical support for its conclusion
that when enacting Articles 15 and 21, Congress intended to make
presidential military commission procedures subject to international
treaties, both present and future. Instead, the Court looks to World War II
precedents, specifically Ex parte Quirin and In re Yamashita, for the
proposition that the UCMJ requires military tribunal procedures to comply
with international laws of war, including the Geneva Conventions. 149 A
closer reading of Ex parte Quirin reveals, however, that the limitation
gleaned from Article 15 applied to the type of crimes that could be tried
militarily and not the procedures of military tribunals. 50 Similarly, in In re
Yamashita, although the Court took pains to show that Yamashita's offenses
were recognized by the law of war,' 5' it never asserted that Article 15
required tribunal procedures to comply with the law of war. 52 To the
contrary, the Court stated, "The Articles left the control over the procedure.
where it previously had been, with the military command."'53
In fact, there is more support in In re Yamashita for the proposition that
the Geneva Conventions substantively bind the President, than for the
proposition that the UCMJ incorporates the Geneva Conventions. In
response to Yamashita's contention that his military trial procedures were
governed by Articles 63 and 60 of the 1929 Geneva Conventions, the Court
146. Id. (citations omitted).
147. See supra notes 120-24 and accompanying text.
148. Article 21 does not state that military commissions must be properly established under
the law of war. See 10 U.S.C. § 821, art. 21 (2006).
149. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2786.
150. See Exparte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29 (1942).
151. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 16 (1946).
152. See id. at 23-24.
153. Id. at 20.
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undertook a serious analysis of the text and history of the Conventions to
determine whether they governed Yamashita's case.'54 It then rejected
Yamashita's Geneva claim on the ground that Article 63 applied only to
trials in which POWs were charged with garden-variety crimes committed
during their captivity.1
55
Assuming, arguendo, that Article 21 codified Congress's intent to bind
the President to international laws of war, there is still the argument that the
unconditional authorization of military commissions in the AUMF and
DTA overrode any external "law of war" limitation in the UCMJ. The Court
dismisses the argument that the AUMF overrode the limitation, stating that
"there is nothing in the text or legislative history of the AUMF even hinting
that Congress intended to expand or alter the authorization set forth in
Article 21 of the UCMJ.' 156 This seems beyond contention as the AUMF
does not say one thing or another about military tribunals. 57 It is harder,
however, to maintain that the DTA is not an unconditional authorization of
the Guantdnamo military commissions, given that it sets forth detailed
procedures for review of those military commissions.'58 It is hard to believe
Congress would prescribe procedures to govern a tribunal it did not wish to
authorize. 5 9 The Court argues that the DTA cannot be an authorization
because the Act reserves judgment on whether the military tribunal
procedures violate the Constitution. 6 However, the Court fails to entertain
the possibility that Congress authorized the tribunals while simultaneously
recognizing that, even with such authorization, they might ultimately be
ruled unconstitutional.'
6
In addition, it appears that the Court's legislative interpretation
incorporates silent conclusions about self-execution. Although non-self-
executing treaties "can be used indirectly as a means of interpreting relevant
154. See id. at 22-23 & n.8.
155. See id. at 22-23.
156. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2775 (2006).
157. See supra notes 20-22, 84-88 and accompanying text (criticizing the Court's
characterization of AUMF as authorization for military tribunals).
158. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2762-63 (describing Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub.
L. No. 109-148 § 1005, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005)).
159. See John Yoo, An Imperial Judiciary at War: Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 2006 CATO SUP.
CT. REV. 83, 97 (2006) ("If Congress never approved of commissions in the first place, why
would it create a review process for them?").
160. Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2775 (citing Detainee Treatment Act § 1005(e)(3)).
161. See Brief for Respondents at *15, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749 (2006) (No.
05-184), 2006 WL 460875 ('The DTA reflects Congress's judgment that the current military
commissions are neither ultra vires nor too deficient to be allowed to proceed to render a final
decision.").
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constitutional, statutory, common law or other legal provisions," 62 there is
an argument that Hamdan's interpretation of the UCMJ implies Geneva
self-execution. Justice Thomas contends in dissent that Article 21's
supposed limitation that military commissions comply with the law of wars,
if meaningful at all, only binds military commissions to conformity with
self-executing treaties. 163 As a consequence, if the Geneva Conventions are
non-self-executing, they cannot be part of the "law of war" that, by statute,
binds the President."6 Whether or not one agrees with Justice Thomas's
characterization of the law of war, his critique exposes that the Court's
decision is not neutral on self-execution. Either the Court accepts Justice
Thomas's construction of the "law of war," in which case it must have
assumed that the Geneva Conventions are self-executing, or it rejects
Justice Thomas's construction, thus indicating that the "law of war"
includes non-self-executing treaties. The implication of the latter
construction is that the President can violate a non-self-executing treaty
through his treatment of an individual, regardless of whether any party
recognizes a violation.
65
The above discussion reveals that Geneva self-execution was an issue
that the Court should not, and perhaps even could not, avoid. The Court
clearly felt that the Geneva Conventions were being violated by the
President. Moreover, the Court plainly desired to compel the President's
military commissions to comply with Common Article 3. The most
straightforward way to do this would have been to find the Geneva
Conventions self-executing. Instead, the Court engaged in daring legislative
interpretation to bind the President to international law without having to
declare the Conventions the "Law of the Land." The next Part explores the
question of why the Court was so reluctant to declare the Geneva
Conventions self-executing.
162. Paust, supra note 13, at 781; see also Anthony D'Amato, Judge Bork's Concept of the
Law of Nations Is Seriously Mistaken, 79 AM. J. INT'L L. 92, 99 n.15 (1985); cf Fund for
Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (indicating that canon of
construction that legislation shall be interpreted so as not to abrogate treaty obligations does not
apply to non-self-executing treaties).
163. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164. See id.
165. Cf D'Amato, supra note 162, at 100 (asserting that "only governments can violate
non-self-executing treaties and, if and when they do, the 'violation' consists only of failure to
enact implementing legislation and not the sorts of substantive violations of treaty principles
that might be helpful to individual plaintiffs").
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IV. REASON To BE AFRAID?
Initially, one might rationalize the Court's avoidance of the self-
execution issue as normal judicial restraint. However, putting the Geneva
Conventions in the tenuous position to be easily overridden by Congress,
especially given that the Military Commissions Act ("MCA"), which
effectively sanitized the President's (illegal) interpretation of Geneva,'66
was on the near horizon, cannot be rationalized as mere judicial
temperance. 167 Moreover, it is difficult to understand why the Court would
have exercised such restraint on the self-execution issue, given that it came
to the same practical conclusion 168 and the United States had much to gain
credibility-wise by a finding of self-execution. 169 One explanation might be
that the Court's hands were tied on the issue of self-execution because
Supreme Court precedent definitively ruled out the possibility of finding the
Geneva Conventions self-executing.
To be sure, there is modem scholarship suggesting that no treaties are
self-executing. 70 Other cases and commentators assert that treaties are
presumptively non-self executing, and only a finding of an explicit intent to
self-execute on the part of treaty makers will render a treaty domestically
enforceable.' 7' These sentiments have culminated in the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations adopting the position that treaties are not
presumptively self-executing and will not be deemed self-executing unless
166. See Military Commissions Act of 2006, 10 U.S.C. §§ 948-50 (2006). See infra notes
268-323 and accompanying text (discussing Military Commissions Act of 2006 ("MCA")).
167. See Paust, supra note 7, at 841 (stating that "[tihis roundabout use of the laws of war"
may seem appropriate as "normal judicial caution," but "such caution in the face of international
crime is less than satisfying").
168. In fact, many believe that the Court's holding and legal machinations were anything
but restrained. See, e.g., Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for
Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 199 (2006)
(noting "lengths to which the Hamdan majority was willing to go to reach its desired result").
169. See Mark D. Kielsgard, A Human Rights Approach to Counter-Terrorism, 36 CAL. W.
INT'L L.J. 249, 292 (2006) (observing that war on terror ruined United States' reputation as
human rights leader).
170. See, e.g., T. Jeremy Gunn, The Religious Right and the Opposition to U.S. Ratification
of the Convention on the Rights of the Child, 20 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 111, 127 (2006) (stating
that it is "basic, black-letter law that human rights treaties in the United States have not been
self-executing-Congress must explicitly declare that provisions prevail over any
countervailing domestic law"); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the Constitution: Treaties, Non-
Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (1999) [hereinafter
Yoo, Globalism]; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual and Structural
Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218 (1999) [hereinafter Yoo, Treaties].
171. See infra notes 202-46 (discussing cases finding treaties non-self-executing); cf David
H. Moore, An Emerging Uniformity for International Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17 (2006)
(asserting that intent to self-execute is "touchstone" of treaty enforceability analysis).
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there is specific evidence that the drafers intended domestic judicial
enforcement. 17 2 It is this modem self-execution doctrine that the Fourth and
D.C. Circuits adopted to conclude that the Geneva Conventions are not self-
executing.'73 The modem view of self-execution is criticized by many
scholars as an unjustified restriction on treaty law, in contravention of the
Constitution. 174
The modem self-execution doctrine is largely a product of scholarly
comment and lower court activism."7 ' Over the last hundred years, the
Supreme Court has done very little to expand the doctrine. 7 6 Accordingly,
the next two sections tell two distinct stories. One is the story of self-
execution in Supreme Court jurisprudence. In this tale, self-execution is a
narrow doctrine that permits a relatively painless finding that the Geneva
Conventions are self-executing. The second story is about lower court
activism broadening the threshold test for self-execution to require, among
other things, a specific intent to self-execute, creating a nearly
insurmountable barrier to domestic treaty enforcement.
A. Self-Execution in the Supreme Court
The Supremacy Clause provides that "all Treaties . . . shall be the
supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby."' 77 As a result of this clear language, the important treaties ratified
in the first several decades of our fledgling Republic were considered a
priori effective by the Court. 78 Then, in 1829, the concept of self-execution
appeared in Foster v. Neilson,179 a Supreme Court case involving land rights
under a treaty between Spain and the United States. The Court ruled that the
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §
111 cmt. h (1987).
173. See supra notes 74-77 and accompanying text (discussing the Fourth Circuit's
approach to self-execution in Hamdi); supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text; infra notes
206-11 and accompanying text (analyzing D.C. Circuit's treatment of self-execution in
Hamdan).
174. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 15, at 202 (criticizing self-execution doctrine as "anti-
constitutional"); Paust, supra note 13, at 781 (asserting that Constitution requires treaties to be
presumptively self-executing); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing
Treaties, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 695, 708 (1995) (arguing that modem intent doctrine is in "tension
with the text and apparent purposes of the Supremacy Clause").
175. See infra notes 228-57 and accompanying text (discussing modem intent doctrine);
see also V:zquez, supra note 174, at 705-10 (discussing intent theory of self-execution).
176. See infra notes 177-227 and accompanying text.
177. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
178. Paust, supra note 13, at 764-66 (asserting that Framer's intent and early judicial
decisions provide no precedent for self-execution doctrine).
179. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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treaty could not be enforced judicially because it only obligated Congress to
pass future legislation ratifying land grants and thus did not create any
present rights. 8 ° Today, courts frequently cite Foster as the basis for the
self-execution doctrine,' 8' relying on the following language:
[A treaty is] to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself without the aid
of any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation
import a contract, when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract
before it can become a rule for the Court.
82
While seemingly straightforward, Foster's holding was itself troubling.
The treaty at issue stated in pertinent part:
"[A]ll the grants of land made before the 24th of January 1818, by
his catholic majesty . . . shall be ratified and confirmed to the
persons in possession of the lands, to the same extent that the same
grants would be valid if the territories had remained under the
domination of his catholic majesty.'1
83
The Court's interpretation that the terms, "shall be ratified," only
obligated Congress to perform a future act of ratification, 84 created a big
enforcement problem. Although breaches of future contractual obligations
can generally be enforced by courts through damages or specific
performance,'85 the Supreme Court or President cannot force Congress to
legislate in order to fulfill a treaty promise. The Court thus construed the
treaty in such a manner as to asssume the President promised Spain
something he could never deliver. 86 However, the plain language of the
180. Id. at 254,314-15.
181. See, e.g., Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Kempthorne, 472 F.3d 872, 879 (D.C. Cir. 2006);
Kwan v. United States, 272 F.3d 1360, 1363 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Stephens v. Am. Int'l Ins. Co., 66
F.3d 41, 45 (2d Cir. 1995); Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1093 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1978);
People of Saipan ex rel. Guerrero v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502 F.2d 90, 101 (9th Cir. 1974).
182. Foster, 27 U.S. at 254, 314.
183. Foster, 27 U.S. at 276 (quoting treaty).
184. Id. at 314-15.
185. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 357 cmt. a (1981).
186. See Foster, 27 U.S. at 314 ("[W]hen the terms of the stipulation import a contract...
the legislature must execute the contract before it can become a rule for the Court."); cf
Vdzquez, supra note 51, at 1128 (noting "pitfalls" in Foster's treaty interpretation). Henry J.
Richardson III explains Foster's curious treaty interpretation as being "born out of judicial
deference to the fruits of military conquest, as redefined through congressional statutory
arrangements for white occupation and land ownership." Henry J. Richardson III, Excluding
Race Strategies from International Legal History: The Self-Executing Treaty Doctrine and the
Southern Africa Tripartite Agreement, 45 VILL. L. REV. 1091, 1109 (2000).
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treaty indicated the President did seek to ratify those grants. 87 Because of
this problem, four years later, in United States v. Percheman,188 the Court
reversed Foster and held that that the grants were ratified by the treaty
because "shall be ratified" denoted a present obligation. 89 Nonetheless,
Foster's general principle-treaties shall be enforced by their terms, such
that if the terms create no clear present obligations the treaty cannot be
enforced-appears sound.19°
The immediate aftermath of Foster and Percheman was varied, with
some cases simply continuing to reaffirm that treaties are presumptively
binding and enforceable.' 9' Other cases distinguished between executory
treaties-those that only create future obligations-and executed treaties,
holding the former unenforceable in the absence of implementing
legislation. 92 After Foster, two other limitations on the domestic
enforceability of treaty provisions emerged. The Head Money Cases of
1884 established that treaties are not judicially enforceable when they only
create "horizontal" obligations, that is, duties between sovereigns, as
opposed to "vertical" obligations to individuals.' 93 Other older cases
established the equality of treaties to federal legislative law, thereby
precluding the enforcement of treaties violative of the Constitution.194 Under
187. This interpretation is supported by the Spanish translation of the treaty as providing
that the land grants "shall remain confirmed." See United States v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
51, 69 (1833) (emphasis added).
188. Id.
189. See id. at 89.
190. Unfortunately, lower courts in recent years have found treaties that do confer present
individual rights to be horizontal and therefore non-self-executing. See, e.g., Diggs v.
Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 850-51 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Kasi v. Commonwealth, 508 S.E.2d 57, 64
(Va. 1998).
191. See, e.g., Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483, 488 (1879); Fellows v. Blacksmith, 60
U.S. (19 How.) 366, 372 (1856); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 592 (1832); see
also Paust, supra note 13, at 771-73.
192. See, e.g., Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270, 285, 288-89 (1902); Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 720-21 (1893); Chae Chang Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581,
600 (1889); see also Paust, supra note 13, at 772 n.82 (citing cases). There are modem day
offshoots of the executory-executed distinction. Recent lower court decisions have held overly
ambiguous treaty provisions unenforceable because enforcing such provisions would strain
judicial competence. See, e.g., Am. Baptist Churches in the U.S.A. v. Meese, 712 F. Supp. 756,
770 (N.D. Cal. 1989).
193. Edye v. Robertson (Head Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598-99 (1884); see also Sloss,
supra note 23, at 27 (describing the horizontal/vertical treaty distinction).
194. See, e.g., Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16-18 (1957); De Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258 (1890); Worcester, 31 U.S. at 593 (stating treaties are enforceable "unless they shall be
deemed unconstitutional"); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES § 111 cmt. a, § 115(3) (1987); Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human
Rights Conventions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 341, 342 (1995) ("[N]one
1044
39:1017] WHO'S AFRAID OF GENEVA LA W? 1045
this view of self-execution, a treaty in violation of, for example, the First
Amendment would be unenforceable. 19 5 A more controversial formulation
of the constitutionality test declares treaties unenforceable if they regulate
subject matter thought to be within the "exclusive" power of Congress."
Over the last hundred years the Court has said very little on self-
execution and certainly not much that broadened the self-execution
doctrine. 197 The Supreme Court has often held treaties conferring individual
rights to be self-executing, without looking for any explicit intent to self-
execute. 198 Such cases, like the 1924 case Asakura v. City of Seattle, allow
private suit directly under treaties to enjoin the government from continued
violations, even in the absence of treaty language on judicial enforcement. 99
Further, the Court has made clear in cases like Cook v. United States2°° that
a treaty conferring individual rights is domestically enforceable even if it
contains provisions outlining international procedures for enforcement.
Moreover, the Court has gone so far as to find a treaty self-executing,
despite its references to domestic law.2°'
of the three branches . . .can give effect to a treaty provision that is inconsistent with the
Constitution.").
195. Henkin, supra note 194, at 342 (noting that hate speech provision of the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ("ICCPR") might not be enforceable because of free
speech).
196. See Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055, 1058 & n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (arguing that
treaty power could not override Congress's exclusive authority to declare war, appropriate
money, and raise taxes), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987); cf. Paust, supra note 13, at 779-
80 (maintaining that, save for declaring war, treaties may operate in all other areas, where
Congress has concurrent powers).
197. Sloss, supra note 23, at 73 ("[T]he Court has never stated or implied that the treaty
makers have the power to countermand the Supremacy Clause."); Vdzquez, supra note 174, at
722 (noting that Supreme Court "has not said more than a sentence or two about the distinction
in any case for nearly a century").
198. See, e.g., Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924) (holding treaty
enforceable as "the supreme law of the land" without looking for intent to self-execute).
199. The Court did not question Asakura's ability to sue for injunction directly under the
treaty. See Asakura, 265 U.S. at 342; see also Bacardi Corp. of Am. v. Domenech, 311 U.S.
150, 162 (1940) (finding right to sue directly under Pan American Trademark treaty).
200. 88 U.S. 102 (1933). Cook involved a U.S. government forfeiture action against a
British vessel that the vessel claimed violated a convention between the United States and Great
Britain. Id. at 107-08; see Convention for Prevention of Smuggling of Intoxicating Liquors,
U.S.-Gr. Brit., art. IV, Jan. 23, 1924, 43 Stat. 1761. The Court dismissed the forfeiture action,
holding that the Convention was self-executing, despite the fact that it prescribed specific
international procedures for vindicating treaty violation claims by British vessels. Id. at 119-22.
201. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 247 (1984)
(holding Warsaw Conventions, which placed liability limit on lost air cargo, self-executing even
though treaty stated liability limit "may be converted into any national currency in round
figures"); Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523, 525-26 (1951) (finding shipowners Liability
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Of course, not every Supreme Court case in the last hundred years has
found the relevant treaty self-executing. The Court has held, for example,
that merely "precatory" provisions describing aspirations are not self-
executing.202 Nonetheless, the sparse collection of self-execution cases over
the last hundred years paint a picture of a Court neither hostile to
internationalism nor generally inclined to search for a broad intent to self-
execute prior to enforcing a treaty. Moreover, the Court has been willing to
allow those claiming rights under treaties to assert their claims in a variety
of forms, without regard to the existence of an internal private right of
action. Justice Breyer, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon,203 sums up the prior
Court cases as recognizing:
(1) [A] treaty obligated the United States to treat foreign nationals
in a certain manner; (2) the obligation had been breached by the
Government's conduct; and (3) the foreign national could
therefore seek redress for that breach in a judicial proceeding,
even though the treaty did not specifically mention judicial
enforcement of its guarantees or even expressly state that its
provisions were intended to confer rights on the foreign
national. 2°
Convention self-executing, even though it provided exceptions under "national laws and
regulations").
202. See, e.g., INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 428 n.22 (1984). This "precatoriness" analysis
has also been utilized by lower courts. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d
774, 809 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 620-21 (Cal.
1952); cf Vdzquez, supra note 174, at 714 (asserting courts have an obligation to construe
vague treaty terms). At least one case, Cameron Septic Tank Co. v. City of Knoxville, 227 U.S.
39, 49 (1913), however, appears broadly to hold a treaty non-self-executing on the basis of
intent. The Court found the Brussels Convention non-self-executing based on the
postratification "sense of Congress." Id. This finding of non-self-execution may have been
informed by some intuition about patent law being an exclusive area of congressional
prerogative. Cf Robertson v. Gen. Elec. Co., 32 F.2d 495, 500-01 (4th Cir. 1929) (creating
special rule for enforceability of patent treaties). In the end, lower courts have not relied on
Cameron Septic to support a general principle that self-execution can be determined by
postratification congressional intent. A Westlaw KeyCite search performed at the time this
Article was written revealed only two nonpatent cases that cite Cameron Septic, and they both
cite it only for the general proposition that non-self-executing treaties do not create judicially
cognizable rights. See Milliken v. State, 131 So. 2d 889, 891 (Fla. 1961); Garcia v. Pan Am.
Airways, 55 N.Y.S.2d 317, 322 (N.Y. App. Div. 1945).
203. 126 S. Ct. 2669 (2006).
204. Id. at 2696 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see David Sloss, When Do Treaties Create
Individually Enforceable Rights? The Supreme Court Ducks the Issue in Hamdan and Sanchez-
Llamas, 45 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 20, 88 (2006) (observing that "the Supreme Court has
never applied the doctrine of non-self-executing treaties to deny a remedy to an individual
whose treaty rights were violated").
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It appears that the portions of the Geneva Conventions relevant to Hamdi
and Hamdan can pass the Supreme Court's tests for self-execution. The
Geneva Conventions largely pass the Foster test,20' because the provisions
conferring rights on prisoners of war are not future, contingent, or merely
aspirational-they confer concrete present rights.2 6 Turning to the other
tests, early Supreme Court cases, most notably the Head Money Cases,
distinguish treaties creating "horizontal" obligations between states, which
are enforceable only through international processes, from treaties creating
"vertical" obligations to individuals.2 °7 In its Hamdan decision, the D.C.
Circuit characterized the Head Money Cases as standing for the proposition
that all treaties are are presumptively horizontal.2 °8 In fact, the court of
appeals used selective quotation to create a fictional default rule of treaty
inferiority.20 9 The Head Money Cases specifically provide that when a
treaty's provisions "confer certain rights upon the citizens or subjects of one
of the nations," such provisions are "in the same category as other laws of
congress." ' Because portions of the Geneva Conventions confer individual
rights, under the Head Money Cases, those provisions are self-executing. 1
Alternatively, proponents of Geneva non-self-execution argue that even
if some treaties are vertical, the Geneva Conventions are horizontal because
205. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
206. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, arts. 5-7, 14, 84-85, 98, 105-06,
129-30; see United States v. Noriega, 808 F. Supp. 791, 799 (S.D. Fla. 1992) ("[T]he ultimate
goal of Geneva III is to ensure humane treatment of POWs-not to create some amorphous,
unenforceable code of honor among the signatory nations."); Jordan J. Paust, Suing Saddam:
Private Remedies for War Crimes and Hostage-Taking, 31 VA. J. INT'L L. 351, 368 (1991)
(observing that "it is difficult to imagine a more mandatory, controlling, detailed, definable,
universal, and useful set of treaty standards" than those in the Geneva Conventions). Only a few
provisions call for future legislation. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 129
("The High Contracting Parties undertake to enact any legislation necessary to provide effective
penal sanctions for persons committing ... grave breaches of the present Conventions.").
Unfortunately, some courts argue that the existence of such a provision renders all of the treaty
non-self-executing. See, e.g., Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1425 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
207. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
208. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("As a general matter, a 'treaty
is primarily a compact between independent nations."') (quoting Edye v. Robertson (Head
Money Cases), 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884)).
209. See John B. Quigley, Toward More Effective Judicial Implementation of Treaty-Based
Rights, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 552, 572 (2006) (calling court of appeals' selective reading of
Head Money Cases "misleading").
210. Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. at 598-99.
211. See David L. Sloss, International Decisions: Rasul v. Bush, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 788,
794 n.66 (2004) (contending that Geneva Conventions "differ from some treaties in that they are
manifestly intended to create primary rights for individuals").
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they intend only interstate enforcement.21 There is some precedential
support for this proposition, given that the Supreme Court stated in a
footnote in the World War II case Eisentrager that "[i]t is ... the obvious
scheme of the [Geneva Conventions] that responsibility for observance and
enforcement of these rights is upon political and military authorities."2"3 The
"curious" Eisentrager dicta, however, mistakenly assumes that Geneva is
wholly horizontal.1 4 Although the Conventions do mention international
procedures,1 5 they also provide rights to individuals.2 6 As Cook and other
Supreme Court precedents make clear, the existence of specific
international procedures within a treaty does not necessarily preclude
domestic remedies for breaches of the treaty provisions conferring
individual rights.21 7 Moreover, it is worth noting that despite the dicta in
footnote, the Eisentrager Court went to lengths to show that Geneva
Conventions did not substantively apply to Eisentrager.2 8
At the time Geneva was signed, treaties did not generally mention
domestic remedies,21 9 likely because a treaty can effectively address
international procedures commonly governing all signatories, but cannot
easily prescribe domestic procedures, given the diversity of signatories.22 °
212. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2845 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the "Conventions have exclusive [international] enforcement mechanisms"); cf
Arthur M. Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 VAND. L. REV. 1205,
1262-63 (1988) (maintaining that a treaty that does not address its enforcement will only be
judicially enforceable if it confers rights upon individuals).
213. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 n.14 (1950).
214. See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2794 (calling footnote a "curious statement").
215. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 132.
216. See supra note 206 and accompanying text (discussing Geneva's individual rights).
217. See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text; see also Sloss, supra note 204, at 96
(noting "numerous cases in which the Supreme Court has approved domestic judicial
enforcement of a treaty that was silent with respect to domestic judicial enforcement, but
provided expressly for international dispute resolution") & n.395 (citing Supreme Court cases).
218. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 789; see Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2793 (noting that Eisentrager
rejected Geneva Conventions claims "on the merits").
219. See Flaherty, supra note 12, at 71 ("[The Geneva Conventions] reflect an older
conception of international law, which generally did not address how a domestic legal system
should provide remedies or otherwise be ordered.").
220. Some lower courts have held that the fact of the diversity of international views of
self-execution means that signatories wanting domestic enforcement must specify so in the
treaty. See, e.g., United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 878 (5th Cir. 1979). This, of course,
means that signing with a country that prohibits self-execution immediately imports that
country's view of treaty enforceability into U.S. law. Such an approach is consequently
criticized by many experts. See, e.g., Stefan A. Riesenfeld, The Doctrine of Self-Executing
Treaties and U.S. v. Postal: Win at Any Price?, 74 Am. J. Int'l L. 892 (1980) (criticizing this
aspect of Postal); John M. Rogers, Prosecuting Terrorists: When Does Apprehension in
Violation of International Law Preclude Trial?, 42 U. MIAMI L. REV. 447, 465 (1987) (asserting
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As a consequence, the "scheme" in Geneva providing international
procedures to govern inter-sovereign disputes, 21 does not necessarily
indicate that the drafters meant to prevent individuals adversely affected by
violations from seeking domestic recourse.222
Turning to the constitutionality test, there is no specific constitutional
right with which the Third Geneva Convention can be said to conflict. 223 A
harder case, of course, is whether the Geneva Conventions usurp powers
exclusively reserved to Congress. 224 Even if one were to assume arguendo
Congress has exclusive power to define and punish offenses against the law
of nations,225 it would not necessarily imply that a treaty could not govern
procedural aspects of military trials or the conditions of detention.226
Moreover, it seems counterintuitive that the subject matter of the conduct of
war is one of the "exclusive" powers of Congress, given the amount of
latitude the President receives in the prosecution of war and the rich history
of treaty law regarding conditions of warfare.227
Consequently, Supreme Court history on the self-execution issue reveals
a very narrow self-execution doctrine, whose prerequisites to treaty
enforceability consist of clarity, constitutionality, and the conferring of
individual rights. Under this doctrine, the Geneva Conventions could have
fairly easily been found self-executing. Thus, Supreme Court jurisprudence
itself cannot explain the current Court's aversion to treaty self-execution.
This aversion then must be a product of lower court activity and scholarly
comment.
that other signatories' dualist systems should not affect self-execution issue); Vdzquez, supra
note 174, at 704.
221. See, e.g., Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 132 (discussing Geneva
Convention procedures).
222. Flaherty, supra note 12, at 71 (observing that "[alt worst [the Conventions] leave the
decision regarding whether a sovereign government should add complementary domestic
remedies or defenses to the sovereign").
223. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
224. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing this controversial construction
of self-execution).
225. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress power "to define and punish
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and offenses against the Law of Nations").
226. Whether a legislative power is exclusive is the subject of much debate. Sloss, supra
note 23, at 30 n. 131 (noting "wide range of scholarly views" on the subject).
227. The regulation of the conduct of war can be analogized to the regulation of
immigration, something the branches participate in jointly and a subject appropriate for treaty
regulation. The Supreme Court has held that treaties regulating the treatment of immigrants are
self-executing although Congress has the power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization.
See Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924); Fok Young Yo v. United States, 185
U.S. 296, 302 (1902).
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B. Self-Execution in the Lower Courts
While the Supreme Court has remained relatively reticent on the issue of
self-execution, lower courts have been busy expanding the self-execution
doctrine into a significant barrier to treaty enforceability. 228 The result is that
the modem self-execution doctrine has reversed the constitutional
presumption that treaties are the supreme law of the land. 9 Many lower
courts have interpreted Foster as establishing treaty-maker intent as the
touchstone of self-execution. 20 Today, lower courts engage in generalized
intent inquiries to determine the domestic enforceability of treaty law.'
This modem intent doctrine manifests in milder and stronger forms. In
its milder form, courts will not enforce a treaty if the language of the treaty
or other evidence indicates that U.S. drafters did not intend the treaty to be
self-executing. 232 If such "intent to non-self-execute" is found, courts will
hold that the treaty is not domestically enforceable, regardless of how
clearly the treaty confers rights. In its stronger form, the intent theory
requires a finding of specific "intent to self-execute" as a prerequisite to
treaty enforceability. 233 These cases take treaty and drafter silence as
establishing nonenforceability, thus voiding the historical presumption that
treaties are by their very nature supreme federal law.234
228. David Sloss asserts that the "presumption against individual enforcement of treaties"
can be traced to "a set of federal circuit court opinions in the 1970s and 1980s." Sloss, supra
note 204, at 92.
229. See, e.g., Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Standt v. City of New
York, 153 F. Supp. 2d 417, 423 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (stating that as a "rule," treaties "rarely grant
rights that may be enforced by an individual"); see also supra note 174 (discussing
constitutional criticism of modem intent doctrine).
230. See, e.g., Igartda-De La Rosa v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005);
Goldstar (Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968-69 (4th Cir. 1992); Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); White v.
Paulsen, 997 F. Supp. 1380, 1386 (E.D. Wash. 1998).
231. See, e.g., Renkel v. United States, 456 F.3d 640, 644 (6th Cir. 2006); Diggs v.
Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (stating that Convention Against Torture must
look to "intent of the signatory parties in language and surrounding circumstances"). Much of
the time this intent against self-execution is found from a non-self-execution ("NSE")
declaration. See infra notes 235-39 and accompanying text.
232. See, e.g., Beazley v. Johnson, 242 F.3d 248, 267 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding provisions of
ICCPR non-self-executing because of Senate intent); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 881
(5th Cir. 1979) (basing non-self-execution decision on statements of individual senator).
233. See, e.g., Igartfia-De La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 150 (holding treaty self-executing only
when it "conveys [such] an intention"); Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1463
(S.D. Fla. 1990) (internal quotation marks omitted) (stating that intent to self-execute must be
evident from language of treaty or "circumstances surrounding its execution").
234. See Vzquez, supra note 174, at 709 (asserting that intent doctrine has "transformed
the self-execution inquiry in a manner that seems fundamentally incompatible with the text of
the Constitution").
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The intent doctrine, even in its milder form, has allowed the Senate to
preclude the domestic enforceability of treaties that confer individual rights
by ratifying them with express non-self-execution ("NSE") declarations.235
Courts have construed such reservations to be the definitive answer to the
question of self-execution." 6 Internationalists criticize NSE declarations on
a number of doctrinal and philosophical grounds. Some contend that such
declarations should be only one factor in the analysis of self-execution.237
Others argue that NSE declarations are not relevant at all because when a
treaty otherwise meets the tests for self-execution, it is supreme law that
cannot be rendered null by the Senate alone. 8 In addition, scholars
characterize as underhanded the government's practice of attaching NSE
declarations deliberately to human rights conventions specifically drafted to
create individual rights rather than interstate obligations.239
235. See, e.g., 138 CONG. REC. S8071 (daily ed. Apr. 2, 1992) ("[T]he United States
declares that the provisions of Articles I through 27 of the [ICCPR] are not self-executing.").
See also Vizquez, supra note 174, at 706-07 n.55 (discussing NSE declarations).
236. See, e.g., Igarttia-De La Rosa, 417 F.3d at 150; Guaylupo-Moya v. Gonzales, 423 F.3d
121, 133, 137 (2d Cir. 2005); Castellano-Chacon v. INS, 341 F.3d 533, 551 (6th Cir. 2003);
Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724 (6th Cir. 2003); Dutton v. Warden, 37 F. App'x 51, 53
(4th Cir. 2002). There is Supreme Court dicta supporting this approach. See Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 735 (2004); cf David Sloss, The Domestication of International Human
Rights: Non-Self-Executing Declarations and Human Rights Treaties, 24 YALE J. INT'L L. 129,
198-204 (1999) (noting that vast majority of cases interpreting treaties subject to NSE
declarations did not rely solely on NSE declarations).
237. See Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M. Abbott, The Scope of U.S. Senate Control
over the Conclusion and Operation of Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 571, 632 (1991) (stating
that the decision of self-execution must be made by courts); see also Igarttia-De La Rosa, 417
F.3d at 189 (Howard, J., dissenting) ("A declaration by the Senate that a treaty is non-self-
executing should not be dispositive.").
238. See HENKIN, supra note 15, at 201-03; see also Henkin, supra note 194, at 347
(asserting that the Constitution does not "allow the President or the Senate, by their ipse dixit, to
prevent a treaty that by its character could be law of the land from becoming law of the land");
John Quigley, Human Rights Defenses in U.S. Courts, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 555, 585 (1998)
(asserting that NSE declaration attached to ICCPR is "not part of what, according to the
Supremacy Clause, is the supreme law of the land"); Stefan A. Riesenfeld & Frederick M.
Abbott, Foreword: Symposium on Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of
Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 293, 296-97 (1991) (arguing that courts "are not bound to apply
expressions of opinion adopted by the Senate").
239. See Lori Fisler Damrosch, The Role of the United States Senate Concerning "Self-
Executing" and "Non-Self-Executing" Treaties, 67 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 515, 517 (1991) (noting
that the Senate attaches declarations to treaties that would otherwise be found self-executing);
Jordan J. Paust, Avoiding "Fraudulent" Executive Policy: Analysis of Non-Self-Execution of the
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 42 DEPAUL L. REV. 1257, 1265 (1993); William A.
Schabas, Invalid Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Is the
United States Still a Party?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 277, 310 (1995) (noting such practice is
objectionable under international law).
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The non-self-execution phenomenon demonstrates the willingness of
lower courts to determine self-execution by going beyond the plain
language of the treaty. Some courts are even willing to derive such intent
from statements made by select U.S. treaty negotiators, officials from the
executive branch, and individual senators.24 ° Other courts answer the intent
inquiry by applying a multifactored test that makes the self-execution
inquiry, not an issue of actual treaty-maker intent, but one of constructive
intent. 241
Finally, lower courts sometimes find a treaty non-self-executing because
it does not itself provide a "private right of action," that is, it specifies
individual rights, but not how to remedy them.242 Generally, however, the
lack of a private right of action does not inevitably make a law
unenforceable. A separate federal statute can provide mechanisms for
vindicating statutory and constitutional rights.243 Moreover, the Court has
found that remedies can stem directly from federal rights, both legislative
and constitutional, even when specific remedial language is absent.24
Nonetheless, in the treaty context courts mistakenly hold that because
certain treaties themselves do not provide private rights of actions, they are
non-self-executing and may not be enforced, even when a private right of
240. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 376 (7th Cir. 1985)
(relying on preratification statement of President Ford); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862,
881-82 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding intent against self-execution in part from statements of
individual senator); Ortman v. Stanray Corp., 371 F.2d 154, 157 (7th Cir. 1967) (relying on
postratification statement of Attorney General); see also Vizquez, supra note 174, at 705 n.47
(citing cases).
241. See, e.g., Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373; People of Saipan v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 502
F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974). Vdzquez criticizes the multifactored test as an invitation for judges
to "engage in an open-ended inquiry to determine on a case-by-case basis whether judicial
enforcement of a particular treaty is a good idea." Vdzquez supra note 174, at 715.
242. There is some confusion among the lower courts as to whether the treaty must show
intent to provide a private right of action or an actual private right of action. Compare Goldstar
(Panama) S.A. v. United States, 967 F.2d 965, 968 (4th Cir. 1992) (requiring "an intent to
provide a private right of action"); United States v. Bent-Santana, 774 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11 th
Cir. 1985) with United States v. Thompson, 928 F.2d 1060, 1066 (11th Cir. 1991) ("A treaty is
self-executing if it creates privately enforceable rights."); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
726 F.2d 774, 808 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring); Huynh Thi Anh v. Levi, 586 F.2d
625, 629 (6th Cir. 1978); Smith v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, 886 F. Supp. 306,
311 n.6 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
243. For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) creates a private right of action for
governmental violations of the Constitution. See Vdzquez, supra note 174, at 719 (noting that
many enforceable laws specify rights without remedies).
244. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,
392 (1971) (holding that "where federally protected rights have been invaded, it has been the
rule from the beginning that courts will be alert to adjust their remedies so as to grant the
necessary relief") (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946)).
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action can otherwise be found.245 Moreover, lower courts tend to ignore the
Supreme Court precedent that individuals may sue directly under a treaty to
enjoin governmental violations.246
Obviously, the Geneva Conventions are much less likely to be found
self-executing under the lower court constructions of self-execution. Were
the Supreme Court to adopt the milder form of the modern intent inquiry, a
finding of treaty-maker intent in favor of non-self-execution would be
dispositive. While there is no NSE declaration attached to the Geneva
Conventions and scant evidence within their language or history to suggest
signatories had such intent,247 lower courts, like the D.C. Circuit, argue that
the lack of domestic enforcement provisions coupled with the existence of
international procedures demonstrates treaty drafters did not intend self-
execution. 248 Even worse, courts have found the Geneva Conventions non-
self-executing by adhering to the stronger intent test and requiring specific
treaty language that the treaty-makers desired domestic application. 249 The
government in its Hamdan brief argued that the Court could only find self-
execution if there was "text or drafting and ratification history to suggest
the revolutionary intent to create judicially enforceable rights.,, 250 For
treaties signed before the past three or four decades, like the Geneva
245. See, e.g., Raffington v. Cangemi, 399 F.3d 900, 903 (8th Cir. 2005) ("seriously
doubt[ing]" whether a claim based on a non-self-executing treaty is "cognizable in habeas");
Wang v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 130, 140 (2d Cir. 2003); Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724
(6th Cir. 2003) (habeas statute only applies to self-executing treaties). But see Atuar v. United
States, 156 F. App'x 555, 563 n.12 (4th Cir. 2005) (entertaining "the possibility that a habeas
corpus petition may require a court to review a particular detention in light of a non-self-
executing but constitutionally ratified treaty"); Vdzquez, supra note 174, at 710 (asserting that
treaty rights may be invoked defensively or through external mechanisms); Jennifer L. Brillante,
Comment, Continued Violations of International Law by the United States in Applying the
Death Penalty to Minors and Possible Repercussions to the American Criminal Justice System,
29 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1247, 1267 (2004) (criticizing this view of self-execution).
246. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text; see also Kenneth C. Randall, Federal
Questions and the Human Rights Paradigm, 73 MINN. L. REV. 349, 394-411 (1988) (discussing
various tests under which courts could find human rights treaties create implied private rights of
action); Sloss, supra note 23, at 83 (suggesting courts should find private rights of action
whenever "a treaty provision is sufficiently determinate").
247. See Sloss, supra note 211, at 794 n.66 (observing that there is no evidence of such
intent in the Senate record).
248. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 38-40 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
249. See, e.g., Linder v. Calero Portocarrero, 747 F. Supp. 1452, 1463 (S.D. Fla. 1990)
(finding Geneva Conventions non-self-executing, despite contrary language in commentaries
supporting domestic enforcement because there was "no language to this effect within the
agreement itself").
250. Brief for the Respondents in Opposition at *26, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749
(2006) (No. 05-184), 2005 WL 2214766 (emphasis added); see also Sloss, supra note 204, at 22
(noting government's recent position that treaties are presumptively non-self-executing).
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Conventions, this test sets up an almost impossible hurdle, as it was unusual
at that time for treaties to reference domestic enforceability.
251
In addition, the Fourth Circuit in Hamdi held the Geneva Conventions
non-self-executing on the ground that they lack an internal private right of
action. 2 However, the federal habeas corpus statute specifically provides a
cause of action when a person is in "custody in violation of the ... treaties
of the United States., 253 The Supreme Court had already observed in Rasul
that the Guantdnamo detainees' claims "unquestionably describe 'custody
in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States.'
' 254
Consequently, whether or not Geneva itself provides a direct right of action
to detainees,255 at the time Hamdan and Hamdi filed suit, a federal statute,
the habeas corpus statute, already provided them a specific legal avenue of
redress.25 6 Nonetheless, the Fourth Circuit incorrectly held that the lack of
an internal private right of action, or intent to provide one, precluded
enforcement, even if other valid legal mechanisms provided a cause of
action. 7
251. See Flaherty, supra note 12, at 71 (observing that older treaties, like the Geneva
Conventions, did not generally mention domestic enforceability).
252. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 468 (4th Cir. 2003).
253. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3) (2006). In addition, the Fourth Circuit could have applied the
test for implied private rights of action in statutes, see Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975), and
found that Hamdi and Hamdan were in the class of persons toward which the Conventions were
directed, the treaty-makers intended to give them a private rights, relief would not frustrate the
Conventions' purpose, and the subject matter of Geneva is not an area reserved to states.
254. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 483 n.15. (2004).
255. Standing to enfore a treaty does not always have to come from a specifically
promulgated private right of action. See supra notes 199-201 and accompanying text; see also
Consulate General of Mexico v. Phillips, 17 F. Supp. 2d 1318, 1322-23 (S.D. Fla. 1998);
Paraguay v. Allen, 949 F. Supp. 1269, 1274 (E.D. Va. 1996) (finding that Paraguay had
standing to sue as party to Vienna Conventions, regardless of whether Conventions created
private rights of action), aff'd, 134 F.3d 622 (4th Cir. 1998); Paust, supra note 47, at 516
(arguing that Geneva Conventions "retain the possibility of private causes of action for their
breach-a practice that predates the conventions"). Moreover, detainees should be able to
invoke Geneva rights defensively, much in the way criminal defendants can invoke the
Constitution defensively. See United States v. Duarte-Acero, 132 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1040 n.8
(S.D. Fla. 2001) (individuals can raise ICCPR claims "defensively").
256. While Hamdan was pending before the Supreme Court, Congress passed the Detainee
Treatment Act of 2005 limiting review of Guantinamo detainees' habeas claims. Pub. L. No.
109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005). There is a question, however, whether the DTA can be squared
with the Suspension Clause, which states, "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not
be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it."
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 2.
257. See Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 468-69; see also Bannerman v. Snyder, 325 F.3d 722, 724
(6th Cir. 2003); supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text (critiquing private right of action
analysis). This analysis also sets up a significant barrier to treaty enforcement because it is
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The Supreme Court's fear of declaring the Geneva Conventions
domestically enforceable is somewhat understandable in this conservative
era of hostility toward international law. The appellate decisions in Hamdi
and Hamdan fall squarely within this modem trend. Perhaps, then, the
Supreme Court in Hamdan did the best thing it could do-it imposed
Geneva limitations on the President without having to get involved with the
messy issue of self-execution, given lower court doctrine. I will
demonstrate below, however, that the Court's choice to ignore self-
execution is not neutral, but rather it definitively undermines claims of the
Court's respect for international law.
V. THE COST OF FEAR
The grave costs of anti-internationalism in this day and age become
apparent upon the recognition that we live in "a world with increasingly
porous borders." '258 The increased transnationalism of government conduct
renders remedies under domestic law often unavailable to people injured by
actions of foreign sovereigns. Consequently, an important check on
government power in an age of globalism is international law.259 The
combination of increasing internationalism of government action with
growing contempt for treaty law can only lead to an explosion of human
rights abuses.26° In this Part, I assert that the terrorism cases are not
internationalist for two principle reasons. First, the ex post position
occupied by the Geneva Conventions is tenuous at best. Second, and more
important, the Court's obvious avoidance of self-execution evidences an
internalization of the isolationist principle that treaties are presumptively
unenforceable.
A. Placing the Geneva Conventions on Shaky Ground
In order to understand the status conferred on the Geneva Conventions
by Hamdi and Hamdan, one simply need consider how the Conventions
operate after the cases. In Hamdi, the Supreme Court made clear that a
unusual for a treaty to set forth domestic procedures for private action, given the fact that
countries with differing domestic laws are involved.
258. Ginsburg, supra note 7, at 3.
259. See Koh, supra note 23, at 1500 (suggesting international law as a check on Bush's
rights-free zones); Little, supra note 102, at 14 (arguing that international materials could reign
in President's claims of embarrassing policies).
260. See Louis Fisher, Lost Constitutional Moorings: Recovering the War Power, 81 IND.
L.J. 1199, 1200 (2006) (asserting that American exceptionalist philosophy contributed to United
States' human rights abuses).
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detainee may challenge his classification as an enemy combatant in an
evidentiary hearing with basic procedural protections.2 6' Not preserved,
however, is a detainee's ability to assert that the fact of his detention or its
conditions violate the Geneva Conventions.262 In fact, Hamdi fits an
unfortunate pattern of the Court refusing to find international law
domestically binding, but holding that an undifferentiated international law
of war provides the basis for enhancing Presidential power.263 The
regrettable consequence is that Hamdi seems to follow the Bush
administration's strategy of "invoking the law of war to avoid prosecuting
terrorist suspects in civilian courts, while ignoring the limits that the law of
war imposes on the detention, treatment, and trial of prisoners. ' 26 Indeed,
likely because of its avoidance of international law, Hamdi has not resulted
in terrorism detainees being treated in accordance with the Geneva
Conventions or released from illegal detention.265
Obviously, Hamdan does not paint such a bleak picture of the Supreme
Court's stance on the Geneva Conventions. In fact, one might believe that
internationalist critique of Hamdan is purely academic because the Court
came to the same realistic result it would have upon a finding of self-
execution. 26' Although the Court ended up striking down the tribunals, the
importance of its avoidance of self-execution can be seen upon analysis of
events after the decision. 267 Hot on the heels of the Court's "liberal"
Hamdan decision striking down the tribunals, Congress passed the Military
Commissions Act (MCA), an act widely characterized as illiberal and anti-
261. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
262. See supra notes 17-21 (discussing Hamdi's avoidance of international law).
263. See, e.g., Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 7 (1942) (defining Article I power with
reference to law of nations). See also Jenny S. Martinez, Note, International Decisions: Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 782, 787 (2004) (observing that "the Supreme Court appears in
Hamdi to have embarked on a questionable path toward creating its own, new constitutional
common law of war, ungrounded either in international humanitarian law or in any specific
legislation enacted by the U.S. Congress").
264. Jonathan Hafetz, Vindicating the Rule of Law: The Legacy of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF., Winter 2007, at 25, 25.
265. See Little, supra note 102, at 14 (asserting that "[a]n unequivocal cue from the
Supreme Court about the importance of international and comparative standards" might have
affected executive policies); Evan J. Wallach, The Logical Nexus Between the Decision to Deny
Application of the Third Geneva Convention to the Taliban and al Qaeda and the Mistreatment
of Prisoners in Abu Ghraib, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 541, 568-70 (2004) (maintaining that
Guantanamo processes do not comply with Geneva).
266. See supra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (discussing scholars who describe
Hamdan as a liberal victory).
267. See Hafetz, supra note 264, at 35 (criticizing the Court's limited holding as potentially
"entrench[ing] a system of indefinite detention without sufficient procedural safeguards").
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internationalist26 that sets up tribunal procedures similar to those instituted
by President Bush.269 The Act unambiguously strips federal courts of
jurisdiction to entertain habeas corpus petitions or other claims by
"unlawful combatants," a class defined relatively broadly. 2 11 It also
precludes detainees from legally asserting Geneva claims and directs courts
to defer to the President's interpretation of the Conventions. 27' The Hamdan
Court applied the Geneva Conventions as part and parcel of congressional
268. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Constitution as Black Box During National
Emergencies: Comment on Bruce Ackerman's Before the Next Attack: Preserving Civil
Liberties in an Age of Terrorism, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 593, 605 n.40 (2006) (noting that MCA
"undermines the tools of accountability by sharply curtailing independent judicial review of
executive detentions"); Press Release, Amnesty International, USA: Congress Rubber Stamps
Torture and Other Abuses (Sept. 29, 2006),
http://news.amnesty.org/index/ENGAMR511572006 (stating that MCA is a "stamp of approval
[on] human rights violations" and has put "the USA squarely on the wrong side of international
law"). Interestingly, China recently stated that the United States has no standing to criticize
human rights violators given U.S. policies like the MCA. Edward Cody, Beijing Hits Back at
U.S. for Raising Rights Concerns, WASH. POST, Mar. 9, 2007, at A16, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/08/AR2007030800747.htm?.
269. See Norman Abrams, Developments in the U.S. Anti-Terrorism Law: Checks and
Balances Undermined, 4 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1117, 1136 (2006) (asserting that MCA
demonstrates Congress's deference to executive discretion); M. Elizabeth Magill, Can Process
Cure Substance? A Response to Neal Katyal's "Internal Separation of Powers," 116 YALE L.J.
POCKET PART 126, 129 (2006), available at http://thepocketpart.org/2006/ll/2/magill.html
(observing that MCA "substantially follows the President's pre-Hamdan conception of military
commissions").
270. The MCA provides, "No court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or
consider an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by
the United States who has been determined by the United States to have been properly detained
as an enemy combatant or is awaiting such determination." Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 7(a), 120 Stat. 2600, 2636 (to be codified in scattered sections of 10, 18,
28, 42 U.S.C.) It further defines an "unlawful enemy combatant" as "a person who has engaged
in hostilities or who has purposefully and materially supported hostilities against the United
States or its co-belligerents" or "a person who, before, on, or after the date of the enactment of
the Military Commissions Act of 2006, has been determined to be an unlawful enemy
combatant." Id. § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948a(2)). This definition is much broader than
Hamdi's definition of enemy combatant as "part of or supporting forces hostile to the United
States or coalition partners in Afghanistan and who engaged in an armed conflict against the
United States." Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 516 (2004) (internal quotations omitted).
Recently, the D.C. Circuit dismissed Guantdnamo detainees' petitions for habeas review,
finding the jurisdiction-stripping provisions of the MCA constitutional. Boumediene v. Bush,
476 F.3d 981, 994 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
271. See Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(g)) ("No alien
unlawful enemy combatant subject to trial by military commission under this chapter may
invoke the Geneva Conventions .. "); Id. § 6(a)(3)(A) (amending 18 U.S.C. § 2241 Note)
("[T]he President has the authority for the United States to interpret the meaning and application
of the Geneva Conventions .... ).
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intent.272 Congress has now clarified that it does not intend for detainees to
have Geneva protections.273
The question is whether a finding of self-execution would have made a
difference. Perhaps, the MCA's procedures in fact comply with the
applicable provisions of the Geneva Conventions. Without even addressing
whether the MCA complies with the Geneva Conventions generally, it does
not even appear to meet Common Article 3's requirements. Hamdan held
that, pursuant to Article 3, tribunals must constitute "ordinary military
courts
' 27  and "[a]t a minimum" mirror courts martial unless
"some practical need" explained the deviation. 5 The Court specified that
"any variance" from regular court martial procedures had to be justified
specifically and the President's claim of need based on the threat of
terrorism is not sufficient justification.276
The Court highlighted several troubling divergences between courts
martial and Bush's tribunals. The Court observed that the ability to exclude
defendants from their hearings 277 and the Secretary of Defense's authority to
change rules midtrial rendered the tribunals irregular under Common
Article 3.278 Furthermore, the evidentiary rule allowing "admission of any
evidence that 'would ...have probative value to a reasonable person"'
violated Article 3's requirement of appropriate judicial guarantees.27 9 Justice
Kennedy's concurrence, which is cross-referenced by the plurality,
addresses in more detail the deviations between Bush's commission
procedures and court martial procedures, including the limited numbers of
jurors, the nonindependent appellate authority, and the ability of military
lawyers to sit as judges.28 °
While the MCA does provide some guarantees absent from Bush's
original order, there are several important variances between MCA and
UCMJ procedures. Here, I will not provide an exhaustive list of differences,
but I will highlight some divergences that show that MCA procedures do
272. See supra notes 142-46 and accompanying text.
273. See Abrams, supra note 269, at 1134 (observing that Hamdan's approach ensured that
"the Court itself might not necessarily be the final arbiter of the issues presented").
274. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2796 (2006) (internal quotations and citations
omitted).
275. Id. at 2797 (quoting Justice Kennedy's concurrence, id. at 2804).
276. Id. at 2792.
277. Id. at 2797.
278. Id. at 2797 n.65.
279. Id. at 2786-87 (calling it a "striking feature" that MCA makes hearsay, coerced
confessions, and unsworn statements admissible); see also id. at 2807-08 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring) (criticizing commissions' evidentiary rules).
280. Id. at 2806-07.
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not satisfy Common Article 3's requirement of procedural parity. 281' As a
general matter, the MCA makes the speedy trial, pretrial investigation, and
much of the self-incrimination provisions of the UCMJ inapplicable to
military commissions, and specifies that any other conflicting provisions are
inapplicable.282 The Act does, however, largely address Justice Kennedy's
concerns by increasing the number of jurors on noncapital offenses, setting
up a more independent appellate authority, and specifying that qualified
military judges may preside over commissions.8 3 Moreover, it gives
defendants the right to be present at proceedings against them, alleviating
the plurality's apparent principal concern. 284 Nonetheless, in addition to the
problematic jurisdiction-stripping portions of the Act,285 there are two
exceedingly troubling divergences between the MCA and UCMJ.
First, the MCA's provisions governing self-incrimination differ
significantly from those in the UCMJ. The UCMJ holds as a general
principle that "[n]o person subject to this chapter may compel any person to
incriminate himself or to answer any question the answer to which may tend
to incriminate him., 286 It also requires that an interrogee be informed of
charges and warned about his right to remain silent.287 Further, the UCMJ
categorically prohibits obtaining statements "through the use of coercion,
unlawful influence, or unlawful inducement., 288 In contrast, the MCA does
not generally prohibit compelled self-incrimination but only states that
"[n]o person shall be required to testify against himself at a proceeding.,
289
In addition, the MCA does not require any warnings before interrogations
281. For more detailed discussions of the MCA, see generally Abrams, supra note 268 and
Eun Young Choi, Note, Veritas, Not Vengeance: An Examination of the Evidentiary Rules for
Military Commissions in the War Against Terrorism, 42 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 139 (2007).
282. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 3(a)(l), 120 Stat. 2600
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(d)).
283. See id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948m(a)) (requiring five commission members for
noncapital adjudications); Id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 950f(a)) (providing for interlocutory
appeals to a three-judge Court of Military Commission Review); Id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. §
948j(b)) (requiring commission judges to be qualified civilian and military judges).
284. See id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(B)).
285. See id. § 7 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 2241); supra notes 270-71 (discussing habeas
stripping provisions and unlawful combatant definition); see also Edith M. Lederer, U.S.
Blasted for Treatment of Detainees, WASHINGTONPOST.COM, Mar. 1, 2007,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/03/01 /AR2007030100052.html
(noting that UN human rights chief, Louise Arbour, called jurisdiction stripping portions of
MCA "legislative setback").
286. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 10 U.S.C. § 831(a) (2006).
287. Id. § 831(b).
288. Id. § 83 1(d).
289. Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(a)).
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and permits the admission of coerced statements.29 ° One of the big questions
during the period before the MCA's ratification was whether the
government should be able to engage in interrogation techniques likely to
qualify as torture under international law. 29' Although the MCA generally
prohibits the admission of confessions obtained by torture, amazingly,
defendants prosecuted for torture are excepted from this provision.292
Moreover, the general prohibition against torture interrogations is
significantly qualified.293 The MCA gives military judges near total
discretion to admit all coerced confessions obtained before December 30,
2005, and discretion to admit all other coerced confessions so long as the
interrogation methods used do not constitute "cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment" as defined in the DTA. 94
Second, the MCA allows the Secretary of Defense to promulgate
evidentiary rules that vary significantly from those set forth in the UCMJ.
295
The MCA counsels the Secretary to promulgate rules of evidence consistent
with court-martial procedure, but only in "so far as the Secretary considers
practicable or consistent with military or intelligence activities. 296 The Act
asserts that the Secretary "may" specify "[e]vidence shall be admissible if
the military judge determines that the evidence would have probative value
to a reasonable person,',297 and permit the introduction of hearsay.29 8 The
problem with these provisions is that Hamdan specifically criticized the
290. Id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(b)-(d)).
291. The White House had urged Congress to adopt a provision permitting interrogation
techniques like waterboarding. This provision was eventually rejected. See James Rowley,
Congress Supports Military Tribunals for Suspected Terrorists, BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 29,
2006,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=aqOAFK2BtWxM&refer=-us.
292. Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(b)).
293. Id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(d)). This leads some experts to conclude that any
sense of victory on the torture issue is illusory. See W. Michael Reisman, Holding the Center of
the Law of Armed Conflict, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 852, 854 (2006).
294. Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(l) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948r(c)-(d)).
295. See id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(a)) (allowing the Secretary of Defense to
promulgate rules concerning "[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures, including elements and
modes of proof').
296. Id.
297. Id. (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(A)). See supra note 279 and accompanying text
(discussing Hamdan's treatment of this provision). This language is disturbingly discretionary
when compared with Federal Rule of Evidence 401, which provides, "'Relevant evidence'
means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to
the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the
evidence." FED. R. EVID. 401; see also Choi, supra note 281, at 157-60 (arguing that MCA
language may permit admission of evidence that would likely be found irrelevant under both
Federal Rules and Military Rules of Evidence).
298. Military Commissions Act § 3(a)(1) (codified at 10 U.S.C. § 949a(b)(2)(E)).
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original military commissions' loose evidentiary rules for allowing the
admission of "multiple hearsay," "unsworn . . . statements," and "other
forms of evidence generally prohibited on grounds of unreliability." 299 On
January 18, 2007, the Secretary of Defense promulgated a voluminous
manual intended to operationalize the MCA.300 Not surprisingly, the
evidentiary portions include the general statement that "[a]ll evidence
having probative value to a reasonable person is admissible ... ."301 In
addition, the manual permits the admission of hearsay,30 2 which can only be
excluded if the opponent proves by a preponderance of evidence that the
statements are unreliable, a near impossible hurdle for terrorism
detainees. °3
There is also the argument that the MCA has now rendered military
commissions "regularly constituted court[s]" for the purposes of Common
Article 33 04 Although Hamdan noted that "[t]he regular military courts in
our system are the courts-martial established by congressional statutes,"3 5 it
did not define Common Article 3 regularity solely with reference to
congressional approval.30 6 Consequently, the Court's analysis leaves open
the possibility that Common Article 3 prohibits "special tribunal[s]"
authorized by Congress. Moreover, even if the MCA makes military
commissions "regularly constituted court[s]," the MCA's lack of procedural
protections renders such courts unable to "afford[] 'all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples,"' as
required by Common Article 3.307 Consequently, in addition to the potential
299. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2808 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see
generally supra notes 295-96 and accompanying text (discussing Court's evidentiary concerns).
300. U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., THE MANUAL FOR MILITARY COMMISSIONS 2007,
http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/The%20Manual%20for%20Military%20
Commissions.pdf [hereinafter MANUAL].
301. Id. pt. III, §4 (Rule 402).
302. Id. pt. HI, § 8 (Rule 803(b)(I)).
303. Id. pt. III, § 8 (Rule 803(c)).
304. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366 § 3(a)(1), 120 Stat. 2600
(codified at 10 U.S.C. § 948b(f)) ("A military commission established under this chapter is a
regularly constituted court.., for purposes of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.").
305. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2803 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
306. The Court explained that the question of regularity is "[i]nextricably intertwined" with
the issue of procedural guarantees. Id. at 2797. Thus, a process sanctioned by Congress that
does not guarantee such protections would not be a "regularly constituted court" for Article 3
purposes.
307. Id. The Court highlights the provision in Protocol I art. 75 that "[n]o one shall be
compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt." Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Convention of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed
Conflicts, (Protocol 1) art. 75(4)(f), June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol 1]. The
MCA appears to violate this directive by allowing detainees to be compelled to confess guilt.
See supra notes 288-94 and accompanying text.
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that continued treatment of detainees under the MCA violates the Geneva
Conventions in ways unaddressed by the Court,3 °8 the military commissions
set up by the MCA appear to violate Common Article 3.
Unfortunately, Hamdan's treatment of the Geneva Conventions severely
curtails current detainees' ability to claim that the MCA's provisions are
unlawful.3"9 Common Article 3 was only made relevant through Article 21
of the UCMJ.31° The MCA now makes clear that portions of the UCMJ
inconsistent with the MCA are no longer valid.311 Thus, the Court's
treatment of the Geneva Conventions as only relevant to congressional
intent invited Congress to legislate Geneva out of Guantinamo, an
invitation it more than happily obliged.3 12 One may counter, however, that a
finding of self-execution would not have placed detainees in a better
position because of the last-in-time rule.313 This not wholly uncontroversial
rule holds that later-enacted statutes have priority over inconsistent treaties
and vice versa.3 1 The argument is that the MCA, to the extent that it is
inconsistent with even self-executing Geneva Conventions, controls the fate
of the terrorism detainees. While this argument is plausible, there remains
the possibility that the MCA's language is not sufficient to annul the
308. See supra notes 17-22 (discussing Hamdan's avoidance of general application of
Geneva Conventions III and IV).
309. This is evidenced by detainees' current inability to obtain relief in federal court in the
wake of Hamdan and the MCA. See Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981, 986-88, 994 (D.C. Cir.
2007) (dismissing petition on basis of jurisdiction-stripping portions of MCA); Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld, 464 F. Supp. 2d 9, 15- 16 (D.D.C. 2006).
310. See supra notes 119-24 and accompanying text.
311. See supra notes 280-294 and accompanying text.
312. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2799 (2006) (Breyer, J., concurring) ("Nothing
prevents the President from returning to Congress to seek the authority he believes necessary.");
see John Fabian Witt, Anglo-American Empire and the Crisis of the Legal Frame (Will the Real
British Empire Please Stand Up?), 120 HARV. L. REV. 754, 794 (2007) (book review)
("Hamdan rests exclusively on statutes, which Congress is free to amend or repeal. Indeed,
Congress appears to have done just this in the Military Commissions Act of 2006.") (footnote
omitted).
313. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (holding that a later enacted
statute supercedes conflicting treaty). Many of the same criticisms lodged against the self-
execution doctrine are set forth regarding the last-in-time rule.
314. See Thomas M. Franck, Dr. Pangloss Meets the Grinch: A Pessimistic Comment on
Harold Koh's Optimism, 35 Hous. L. REV. 683, 688 (1998) (asserting that "by inventing such
doctrines such as the 'non-self-execution' of treaties and the 'last in time' doctrine, courts have
made Swiss cheese of the notion that international law is part of the law of the United States");
Louis Henkin, Treaties in a Constitutional Democracy, 10 MICH. J. INT'L L. 406, 425-26 (1989)
(criticizing rule as contrary to framers' intent); Detlev F. Vagts, Taking Treaties Less Seriously,
92 AM. J. INT'L L. 458, 459 (1998); Ernest A. Young, Institutional Settlement in a Globalizing
Judicial System, 54 DUKE L.J. 1143, 1208 n.274 (2005) (characterizing last-in-time rule and
self-execution doctrine as "ingenious devices for making limits on international law disappear
[which] seem to reflect a basic contempt for such limits").
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Geneva Conventions generally or Common Article 3 specifically. In order
to supercede a duly ratified treaty, Congress's intent to repeal the treaty
must be clear.31 5 Promulgating legislation touching subject matter also
governed by a treaty does not necessarily mean that Congress intended to
supercede the treaty.
1 6
The MCA, it seems, does not seek to nullify the Geneva Conventions.3 7
First, the MCA's stated intent is to establish military commissions that
comply with Common Article 3. 31" The fact that the MCA wrongly
interprets Geneva as allowing the specified tribunals, does not necessarily
mean that the Act sought to eviscerate Common Article 3.3I9 Moreover, the
MCA's directive that individual detainees are prohibited from invoking the
Conventions can be seen merely as Congress's post-ratification view of
Geneva self-execution, which is itself not dispositive of and perhaps
irrelevant to the treaty's status.32°
Perhaps this is all sound and fury signifying nothing given that the
jurisdiction-stripping portions of the MCA divest detainees of a forum to
315. See Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Franklin Mint Corp., 466 U.S. 243, 252 (1984)
(citing cases); Washington v. Wash. State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443
U.S. 658, 690 (1979) (superceding treaty requires "explicit statutory language"); Pigeon River
Improvement, Slide & Boom Co. v. Charles W. Cox, Ltd., 291 U.S. 138, 160 (1934) (stating
that "intention to abrogate or modify a treaty is not to be lightly imputed to the Congress");
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 120 (1933); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS LAW § 115(1)(a) (1987) (stating that legislation must have clear purpose to
supercede treaty).
316. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 115 cmt. a (1987) (A
statute containing "matters inconsistent with international law ... does not necessarily imply a
Congressional purpose to supersede the international law."); cf Jordan J. Paust, Rediscovering
the Relationship Between Congressional Power and International Law: Exceptions to the Last
in Time Rule and the Primacy of Custom, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 393 (1988) (noting that treaties
have not been superceded by statutes in cases where treaty provision has gained constitutional
status, where treaty is executed or creates vested rights, and where relevant legislation is derived
from war power (because such is naturally subject to law of nations)).
317. Moreover, the government has not denounced the Geneva Conventions under the
procedures laid out in the Conventions. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 6, art. 142.
318. See supra notes 305-08 and accompanying text.
319. Admittedly, this seems to raise a fairly novel question of whether Congress's incorrect
interpretation of a treaty is a repeal of the treaty. Michael Van Alstine states, "It is possible,
under the last-in-time rule for a congressional statute to overturn a judicial interpretation of a
treaty. The problem with this option, is that the meaning of a treaty is then subject to the
vagaries of the domestic legislative process." Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith
in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1934 n.345 (2005)
(internal citation omitted).
320. See supra notes 177-257 and accompanying text (discussing tests for self-execution).
But see Julian G. Ku, Treaties as Laws: A Defense of the Last-in-Time Rule for Treaties and
Federal Statutes, 80 IND. L.J. 319, 342 (2005) (asserting that "Congress has the power to
unilaterally declare a treaty non-self-executing for purposes of domestic law").
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assert rights even under self-executing Geneva Conventions. 32 Of course,
this depends on whether the jurisdiction-stripping portions of the MCA
survive constitutional review, which they very well might if lower court
decisions are any indication.322 I believe, however, the Court declaring the
Geneva Conventions self-executing rather than exhorting Congress to test
the limits of presidential war power would have made a difference.
Congress might very well have seen only two options: set up procedures
that unambiguously comply with the Conventions or explicitly supercede
the Conventions. Although one could argue that this would have created a
perverse incentive for Congress to nullify the Conventions, Congress,
especially under its post-election configuration, would likely have been
exceedingly reluctant to repeal explicitly a treaty as important and widely-
publicized as the Geneva Conventions.
In the end, therefore, Hamdan allowed Congress to rubber stamp
procedures in violation of the Geneva Conventions, while retaining the
pretense of respect for Geneva's principles. The Court thus became
complicit in the U.S. government's strategy of claiming to the world that it
adheres to the "principles" of international law while simultaneously
divesting that law of substantive effect.3 23 Let me assume for a moment,
however, that the MCA, as written, would trump even self-executing
Geneva Conventions, such that a finding of self-execution would have made
no practical difference. Even then the Court's avoidance of self-execution is
not neutral because it evidences an internalization of the principle that
treaties are not supreme law.
B. Accepting the Isolationist Self-Execution Doctrine
As noted earlier, historically, treaties were presumptively the law of the
land. Many notable legal historians have discussed the events surrounding
the drafting and ratification of the Supremacy Clause3 24 and concluded the
321. See Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (holding that statute's procedural
provisions regarding habeas jurisdiction modified Vienna Conventions).
322. See supra note 309 and accompanying text (discussing cases denying jurisdiction
under MCA provisions).
323. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (discussing American exceptionalism);
infra notes 345-48 and accompanying text (criticizing United States's two-faced approach to
international norms).
324. See, e.g., Martin S. Flaherty, History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original
Understanding, and Treaties as "Supreme Law of the Land," 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095 (1999);
Vdzquez, supra note 174, at 697-700; John C. Yoo, Treaties and Public Lawmaking: A Textual
and Structural Defense of Non-Self-Execution, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2218, 2231 (1999) (setting
forth controversial argument that framers intended presumptive non-self-execution).
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Framers embraced a "monist" conception of treaty law, that is, treaty law
and domestic law are one in the same,3 25 to signal to other sovereigns that
the burgeoning republic would honor its international agreements.326
Internationalism was part and parcel of the structure of the Constitution. It
then took over forty years for the concept of self-execution to be introduced
into the law.3 27 Even then, the early cases stood for the relatively
circumscribed principle that a self-executing treaty must be definite,
constitutional, and create individual rights.328
Fast forward to today. The modem approach to self-execution bears little
resemblance to the limited judicial intervention represented by the early
cases. 329 How did courts get from Foster and the limited meaning of non-
self-execution to this overarching idea that the question of intent must be
primary in any treaty enforceability inquiry? While some assert that the
modem self-execution doctrine is simply the result of years of sloppy legal
reasoning,330 there is evidence that anti-internationalist hostility to treaty
law, tied to a more sinister desire to preserve racial hierarchy, constituted
the driving force behind the self-execution doctrine. First, the shoddy legal
reasoning behind modem self-execution analyses, combined with their
isolationist results, render facially pretextual any claim that such modem
approaches are merely good faith interpretations of Foster. Second, the
development of self-execution law was intertwined historically with efforts
to obstruct international law from advancing civil rights. Third, the
supposed neutral arguments in favor of treaty non-self-execution appear to
be mere masks for deeper isolationist sentiments.
325. Monist systems are contrasted with dualist systems that always require implementing
legislation before recognizing a treaty as domestically enforceable. See Foster v. Nielson, 27
U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (stating that the "different principle" in United States declares a "treaty to
be the law of the land"); Jinks & Sloss, supra note 34, at 126. But see Yoo, supra note 324, at
2231 (claiming the U.S. has a dualist system). Britain is a commonly cited example of a
"dualist" legal system. See Lord Templeman, Treaty-Making and the British Parliament, 67
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 459, 481-83 (1991).
326. See Vdzquez, supra note 174, at 698-99 (observing that the Supremacy Clause was in
part a response to the problem of repeated violations by states of peace treaties with Britain).
327. Paust, supra note 13, at 760.
328. See supra notes 177-226 and accompanying text (discussing early formulations of
self-execution doctrine).
329. See supra notes 228-57 and accompanying text (examining modem constructions of
self-execution).
330. See, e.g., Van Alstine, supra note 319, at 1887 (calling modem bad faith treaty
jurisprudence product of a "combination of inattention and Supreme Court rhetorical
ambiguity"); Vdzquez, supra note 174, at 722 (asserting that modem self-execution doctrine is
result of "sloppy reasoning and careless use of precedent").
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1. Deceptive Legal Reasoning to Reach Isolationist Results
The modern self-execution doctrine is not a necessary consequence of
constitutional interpretation, but rather a product of anti-internationalist
judicial activism.33" ' Proponents of the modem self-execution doctrine tend
to rely on language from Foster distinguishing between an executed treaty,
which is automatically domestic law, and a treaty in which "either of the
parties engages to perform a particular act," which must be executed by the
legislature to be enforceable.33 2 Supporters of the modern intent doctrine
assert that this language calls for a differentiation between treaties in which
parties have manifested intent to self-execute, which are enforceable, and
treaties absent such intent, which are not.333 The proposition that the modern
intent analysis is a natural consequence of Foster may appear initially
reasonable, but further examination exposes it as a total subterfuge. Basing
the modern intent doctrine on Foster is an amazing legal sleight of hand
which reveals that more was really going on than a mechanical adherence to
precedent.
While Foster was arguably a case concerned with intent, such intent
regarded solely the terms of the treaty.3 34 The Foster Court, charged with
the task of interpreting the treaty, determined, however wrongly, that the
parties executed a somewhat illusory contract to ratify land grants subject to
the future approval of a third-party (namely Congress). 35 Despite the many
criticisms one could lodge against this conclusion, 3 6 Foster is clearly an
opinion that seeks to enforce a treaty by its terms.337 Today, however, lower
courts have unjustifiably relied on Foster as support for creating a
331. See Sloss, supra note 204, at 88 (observing that modem courts "have expanded the
Foster exception to the point where it threatens to swallow the underlying principle").
332. Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829). Sloss notes, "Commentators have
generally understood Foster and Percheman to distinguish between treaty provisions that have
no domestic legal effect in the absence of implementing legislation (non-self-executing) and
provisions that do have domestic legal effect, even without implementing legislation (self-
executing)." Sloss, supra note 23, at 21-22; see also Sloss, supra note 204, at 78 (claiming that
virtually every modem case that reverses presumption of treaty enforceability relies on Foster).
333. See, e.g., Moore, supra note 171, at 14-16 (lower courts citing Foster as basis for
intent theory); Moore, supra note 171, at 15-16 (asserting that both Foster and Percheman
looked to parties' intent regarding enforceability to determine effect of treaty).
334. See Vdzquez, supra note 174, at 701-02 (observing that Foster merely recognizes that
enforceability of a treaty "may be altered by the parties to the treaty through the treaty itself').
335. See Sloss, supra note 204, at 85-87 (noting that Foster interpreted the treaty to grant
"the plaintiffs an inchoate title in the subject property" but not "vested legal rights").
336. See supra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (criticizing Foster's holding as
contrary to text and intent of treaty).
337. See Sloss, supra note 23, at 13 (asserting that the inquiry in Foster was not "whether
the treaty makers intended to create a non-self-executing treaty"); Vdzquez, supra note 174, at
701-02.
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secondary hurdle to enforcement that can only be overcome if the parties
have stated, either in the treaty or elsewhere, that they specifically desire the
treaty to have domestic effect.338 This conclusion is as untenable as using a
routine statutory or contract interpretation case that refuses to implement
vague terms as a basis for requiring specific language in all statutes and
contracts that the documents are really enforceable.339
Lower courts' justiciability analyses rest on similarly questionable logic.
They hold that a lack of an internal private right of action automatically
makes a treaty unenforceable, even when a private right of action can be
found elsewhere in the law.34° Such a conclusion, however, would be
unheard of in the statutory context and is, in fact, at odds with Supreme
Court precedent.341 Consequently, over time, courts have used defective
reasoning to twist Foster's limited holding into doctrine that erects specific
evidentiary hurdles to treaty enforceability.
3 42
The above demonstrates that the modem intent doctrine was not a logical
outgrowth of Foster, but a deliberate choice. This choice has two principal
effects: (1) It creates a clever insurmountable barrier to the domestic
enforcement of treaties ratified prior to the creation of the modem intent
doctrine; and (2) it facilitates the current practice of signing treaties in bad
faith. Addressing the first effect, as noted before, requiring intent to self-
execute as a prerequisite to treaty enforceability likely renders any treaty
ratified before the last forty years unenforceable.3 43 The only reason a
signatory would add a provision specifically saying that the legal instrument
338. See supra notes 228-57 (discussing modem intent doctrine); see also Vdzquez, supra
note 174, at 708 (asserting that such cases "have reversed the presumption recognized by the
Court in Foster and Percheman").
339. The fact that certain statutes are executory has never been ground to require all
legislation in that area to evidence intent to self-execute. See United Shoe Mach. Co. v.
Duplessis Shoe Mach. Co., 155 F. 842, 845 (1st Cir. 1907) (noting that statutes can be
executory by their terms). For example, the fact that some statutes are non-self-executing
because they set forth only general directives that administrative agencies must convert into
binding rules does not mean that all legislation is therefore presumptively unenforceable in the
absence of specific language that the statute does not address itself to agency implementation.
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006).
340. See supra notes 242-46 and accompanying text (describing the private right of action
test).
341. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text (discussing Asakura); see also Sloss,
supra note 204, at 57-70 (discussing Supreme Court cases finding treaties self-executing in
absence of private right of action).
342. See Paust, supra note 13, at 767 (asserting that later commentators "have distorted
[Foster's] meaning and created tests ... patently inconsistent with the text of the Constitution,
the predominant expectations of the Framers and early judicial opinions").
343. See supra notes 249-57 and accompanying text (discussing effect of stronger intent
doctrine on Geneva Conventions).
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is enforceable is if she thought doing so was required. Prior to recent
judicial developments, there was little reason for drafters to believe that
specifically declaring intent to self-execute was necessary.3" Therefore,
looking for specific language on self-execution operatively makes any older
treaty presumptively non-self-executing, regardless of whether treaty
drafters intended to create domestically enforceable rights.
As for the second effect, the modern self-execution doctrine permits the
United States to continue the ruse of signing human rights treaties, so that it
can appear to be following modem civilized trends, while simultaneously
making them unenforceable. 3 45  The widely shared view among
internationalists is that the NSE declaration trend borders on bad faith,
especially when combined with evidence that the government will not set
forth implementing legislation in the future.346 Scholars contend that such
declarations are inconsistent with the international law principle that
domestic laws should not preclude enforcement of valid treaty
obligations.347  In addition, these reservations seem fundamentally
incompatible with "America's self-perception as a leading proponent of
human rights., 348 In sum, the modem self-execution doctrine, which is
mired in a bog of confusing and unintuitive legal principles, may not readily
344. See Sloss, supra note 23, at 71 (noting that prior to 1965, there was little support for
modem intent self-execution doctrine); Sloss, supra note 204, at 101 (noting that before World
War II, the Court continued to recognize presumption of treaty enforceability and after the War
said very little on the issue).
345. See supra notes 26-35 and accompanying text (noting that President Bush has vowed
to abide by Geneva "principles" while simultaneously arguing for the Conventions'
unenforceability); see also Henkin, supra note 194, at 346 (asserting that signing treaties with
non-self-executing declarations allows United States to claim respect for international law while
guaranteeing that law is essentially empty); Paust, supra note 239, at 1284 (arguing that "as
long as the [United States' non-self-execution] policy remains, . . . our government is not
functioning as one of, by, and for, the people of the United States"); cf Jed Rubenfeld,
Unilateralism and Constitutionalism, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1989 (2004) (asserting that the
United States simply never intended for international law to be anything other than vehicle for
exportation of Americanism).
346. See Paust, supra note 239, at 1257 (asserting that "wretched" example of United States
reserving on ICCPR exemplified the Senate's practice of being "miserably compliant with the
Executive and its failed leadership"); Sloss, supra note 23, at 11 (arguing if a treaty creates a
primary right, a court has an obligation to consider available remedies).
347. See, e.g., Natsu Taylor Saito, The Plenary Power Doctrine: Subverting Human Rights
in the Name of Sovereignty, 51 CATH. U. L. REV. 1115, 1117-19 (2002) (observing that non-
self-execution practice "violates a fundamental principle of customary international law... that
a 'party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to
perform a treaty"') (quoting Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969,
1155 U.N.T.S. 331, 339 (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980)).
348. Riesenfeld & Abbott, supra note 237, at 631.
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appear as what it is-a mechanism whose primary purpose is to allow the
United States to double deal in international law.349
There are other aspects of the modem self-execution doctrine that seem
patently anti-internationalist. Some courts, like the Seventh Circuit in
Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, resolve the self-execution
issue by applying a multifactored test analyzing: "(1) the language and
purposes of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances surrounding its
execution; (3) the nature of the obligations imposed by the agreement; (4)
the availability and feasibility of alternative enforcement mechanisms; (5)
the implications of permitting a private right of action; and (6) the
capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute. 3 51 Some of this test is
arguably an extension of Foster's principles,35" ' while other portions
incorporate the modem intent doctrine and are thus subject to the criticism
above.
352
The most patently anti-internationalist portions of the test require courts
to consider the availability of nontreaty remedies and analyze the costs of
349. Francisco Forrest Martin, The Constitution and Human Rights: The International
Legal Constructionist Approach to Ensuring the Protection of Human Rights, I FLA. INT'L L.
REV. 71, 85-86 (2006) (characterizing non-self-execution as a "weapon" that permits the United
States to be "an outlaw in the international community" and engage in "double-dealing by, on
the one hand, agreeing to be bound by a treaty and, on the other hand, reserving the right to not
give the treaty any effect").
350. See Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 373 (7th Cir. 1985)
(citing Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 808-10 (D.C. Cir. 1984); United
States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 876-77 (5th Cir. 1979); People of Saipan v. Dep't of Interior,
502 F.2d 90, 97 (9th Cir. 1974); Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 617, 620-22 (Cal. 1952).
351. The sixth prong, involving the capability of the judiciary to resolve the dispute, can be
interpreted in a couple of different ways. One way is compatible with Foster in that it holds
certain treaty terms are so ambiguous that it would strain judicial competency to interpret and
enforce them. See Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet) 253, 374 (1829); Tel-Oren, 726 F.3d at 809
(refusing to enforce U.N. Charter provisions because they are "phrased in broad generalities,
suggesting that they are declarations of principles"); cf Vizquez, supra note 174, at 715 (stating
that "there may be imprecise treaty provisions that the judicial branch is well suited to
enforce"). Another way to interpret prong six is to say that the judiciary cannot enforce treaties
if doing so interferes with proper political processes. See Frolova, 761 F.2d at 375 (citing Flynn
v. Shultz, 748 F.2d 1186, 1189-93) (7th Cir. 1984) (holding present case involved "foreign
policy matters" that "courts are ill-equipped to anticipate or handle"); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at
810; Diggs v. Richardson, 555 F.2d 848, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1976). Most modem courts, however,
do not go this far, instead holding that the primary implication of the political question doctrine
is that courts should defer to the political branch's interpretations of treaties. See generally
David J. Bederman, Deference or Deception: Treaty Rights as Political Questions, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1439 (1999) (analyzing judicial deference in relation to executive branch's
interpretation of treaties); Louis Henkin, Is There a "Political Question" Doctrine?, 85 YALE
L.J. 597 (1976) (examining judicial deference on political questions).
352. Supra notes 228-57 and accompanying text (discussing modern intent doctrine).
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permitting a private right of action.353 However, if a treaty's provisions are
redundant of domestic laws, then the litigant or court should have the ability
to choose the law under which to obtain or grant relief, just as if both a
federal statute and a constitutional provision provided similar rights. Thus,
Frolova relegates treaties to the law of very last resort. In addition, the
inquiry into costs of treaty enforceability evidences a prejudice against
international law. Courts cannot refuse to give effect to statutes whenever
they feel a suit is too costly. Yet this is exactly what judges are invited to do
for treaties.354 This unjustified consideration of the "costs" of treaty
litigation most likely stems from Judge Bork's concurrence in Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic, which is fairly obsessed with the burdens of treaty
enforcement. He warns that permitting private Geneva claims would "flood
courts throughout the world" and "create perhaps hundreds of thousands or
millions of lawsuits. 355
2. Historical Ties with Isolationism
There is also historical evidence that an aversion to foreign "liberal" law
drove the modern self-execution doctrine. History reveals an incredibly
unpalatable legal moment as one of the main catalysts of the isolationist
stance toward treaty law.356 The post-World War II era experienced a drastic
rise in the prominence of international organizations and international
conventions.15' The United States, which was still mired in post-Jim Crow
inequality and the racial sentiment surrounding internment, ratified the U.N.
Charter, which boldly stated several human rights principles incompatible
with racial stratification. 358 The growth of international organizations and
human rights conventions concerned segregationists and conservatives
353. Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373.
354. The problem is that courts are "exceedingly timid in enforcing treaties, particularly
when individuals have sought to enforce them against the executive branch of the federal
Government." Vizquez, supra note 174, at 717.
355. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 809 n.16, 810 (Bork, J., concurring).
356. Henry Richardson traces Foster's racial underpinnings and asserts that the self-
execution doctrine "has generally served as a barrier to the direct incorporation from treaties of
international rights into American law [and] . . . generally prevented African-Americans and
other peoples of color in the United States from directly invoking their international human
rights in local and federal courts." Richardson, supra note 186, at 1099.
357. See David Golove, Human Rights Treaties and the U.S. Constitution, 52 DEPAUL L.
REV. 579, 585 (2002) (noting that post-World War II era saw "the birth of the modem human
rights era").
358. See Quigley, supra note 209, at 579 (asserting that United States's racial situation was
an obstacle to approval of post-World War II human rights treaties).
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alike.359 In 195 1, Senator John Bricker, a Republican from Ohio, introduced
a draft amendment to the Supremacy Clause to make all treaties
unenforceable in the absence of implementing legislation. In addition, the
amendment would serve to prohibit Congress from ratifying a treaty whose
provisions Congress would not have had the power to enact as legislation.36 °
Two racial discrimination cases, Oyama v. California361 and Sei Fujii v.
State,362 served as catalysts for this legislation.
Oyama presented a challenge to California's racist Alien Land Law by a
Japanese immigrant who had purchased land at market value and deeded it
to his citizen minor son, Fred.363 The Law prevented aliens ineligible for
citizenship, namely Japanese, from owning land3 64 and invalidated any
transfer made with the intention of avoiding the Law. 365 The California
Supreme Court held that under the Alien Land Law, Fred never owned the
property because the transfer was invalid.366 The U.S. Supreme Court
reversed and held, not that the Alien Land Law was facially
unconstitutional, but that the law, as applied to a citizen, Fred, violated the
Equal Protection clause.367 Notably, four justices expressed the view that the
Law should be struck down as violative of the U.N. Charter. Justices Black,
Douglas, Murphy and Rutledge opined that the United States' commitment
to human rights under the U.N. Charter supported invalidating California's
discriminatory law.3 68 Similarly, in Sei Fujii, a California court of appeals
struck down that same Law specifically on the ground that it violated the
U.N. Charter, observing that the Charter had become the "supreme Law of
359. See id. (asserting that the United States failed to ratify human rights treaties "fearing
that the dirty laundry of segregation might be aired on a world stage"); see also Vicki C.
Jackson, World Habeas Corpus, 91 CORNELL L. REV 303, 331-32 (2006) (noting post-World
War II birth of "virulent opposition to the idea of international human rights").
360. There were several versions of the amendment, but the basic premise of the
amendment was to ensure that "[a] treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of a treaty." S. REP. No. 83-
412, at 1 (1953).
361. 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
362. 217 P.2d 481 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950).
363. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 635-36.
364. Id. at 636, 644; see also Alien Land Law, I Cal. Gen. Laws Act 261 (Deering 1944,
1945 Supp.).
365. Alien Land Law § 9.
366. Oyama, 332 U.S. at 639-40.
367. Id. at 640.
368. See id. at 649-50 (Black, J., concurring, joined by Douglas, J.) ("How can this nation
be faithful to this international pledge if state laws which bar land ownership and occupancy by
aliens on account of race are permitted to be enforced?"); Id. at 673 (Murphy, J., concurring,
joined by Rutledge, J.) (stating that "inconsistency with the [U.N.] Charter ... is but one more
reason why the statute must be condemned").
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the Land" such that "every State in the Union accept and act upon the
Charter according to its plain language and its unmistakable purpose and
intent. 3 69 Eventually, the Supreme Court of California overturned that
portion of the opinion, finding the U.N. Charter non-self-executing because
it only stated "general purposes."3 7
Although neither case ended up prioritizing the U.N. Charter over
domestic law, they were enough to concern Senator Bricker that the U.N.
Charter and the proposed International Covenant on Human Rights
threatened to undermine racial segregation in the South. In Senator
Bricker's view, Oyama and Sei Fujii signaled the looming threat of
international human rights covenants "forcing unacceptable theories and
practices upon the citizens of the United States of America. 37' One
Brickerite warned the Senate that if the Amendment failed to pass, liberals
could assert "that the entire civil rights program has already effectively been
imposed on the United States through the United Nations Charter itself,
without the need for any congressional action whatever.
372
The Bricker Amendment eventually failed to pass the Senate by one
vote, but Bricker only agreed to abandon his quest upon President
Eisenhower's assurance that he would neither seek ratification of the
Genocide Convention nor sign other human rights treaties. 373 There is a
consensus among many scholars and historians that the Bricker Amendment
was based in large part on a desire to preserve racial hierarchy.374 Scholars
note the:
369. Sei Fujii v. State, 217 P.2d 481, 486-88 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1950) (stating that "[t]he
Alien Land Law must therefore yield to the treaty as the superior authority").
370. Sei Fujii v. State, 242 P.2d 617, 619-21 (Cal. 1952).
371. 97 CONG. REC. 9,11361 (1951) (statement of Sen. Bricker). The quotation is an
excerpt from a resolution adopted by the Tampa Rotary Club that Senator Bricker inserted into
the Record. Id.
372. Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. 130 Before a Subcomm. of
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 82d Cong. 53 (1952) (statement of Eberhard Deutsch).
373. Henkin, supra note 194, at 348-49. Eisenhower's Secretary of State promised that the
administration would not seek ratification of any of the various proposed human rights treaties.
See also Treaties and Executive Agreements: Hearings on S.J. Res. I and S.J. Res. 43 Before a
Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 83d Cong. 825 (1953).
374. See, e.g., Stanley A. Halpin, Looking Over a Crowd and Picking Your Friends: Civil
Rights and the Debate over the Influence of Foreign and International Human Rights Law on
the Interpretation of the U.S. Constitution, 30 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 8 (2006)
("Brickerites['] ... real concern appeared to be defending state sovereignty and preserving the
ability of southern states to maintain segregation and white supremacy in the face of the U.N.
Charter."); Henkin, supra note 194, at 348 ("The campaign for the Bricker Amendment
apparently represented a move by anti-civil-rights and 'states' rights' forces to seek to
prevent-in particular-bringing an end to racial discrimination and segregation by
international treaty."). But see Nelson Richards, The Bricker Amendment and Congress's
Failure to Check the Inflation of the Executive's Foreign Affairs Powers, 1951-1954, 94 CAL. L.
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[H]istorical symmetry between the Doctrine having been born to
uphold a government policy of racial conquest, and the Doctrine's
present status of being consistently used by the judiciary and
political branches to bar people of color, in a context of continuing
American racism, from invoking the full width of human rights to
which they are entitled for protection ....
It seems, however, there was more underlying the Bricker Amendment
than the simple desire to preserve white privilege. As one scholar put it,
"while the U.S. Senate's refusal to ratify the early human rights conventions
may well have reflected Southern racism, it also reflected something
else. 3 76 The Bricker era was a backlash to the emergence of international
organizations and the signing of the U.N. Charter. Frank Holman, former
American Bar Association President and architect of the Bricker
Amendment, explained that the Amendment marked the "line ... between
those Americans who believe in the preservation of national sovereignty
and national independence and those who believe that our national
independence . . . should yield to international considerations and some
kind of world authority.,
377
The Bricker era brought to light a xenophobic, anti-internationalist, anti-
human rights philosophy that persists today and currently taints Supreme
Court law,378 even law purporting to be internationalist. This anti-
internationalist sentiment cannot be explained away as merely instrumental
to the United States' ability to avoid implementing human rights laws that
upset racial, gender, or other hierarchy.379 It is true that since 9/11, the
United States appears to have erected barriers to Geneva specifically so that
REV. 175, 177-78 (2006) (asserting that concerns over communism abroad and President
Truman's amassing of executive power prompted the Bricker Amendment).
375. Richardson, supra note 186, at 1117.
376. Rubenfeld, supra note 345, at 1989-90.
377. FRANK E. HOLMAN, STORY OF THE "BRICKER" AMENDMENT 22 (1954). Holman
believed that "all lovers of America" should be concerned because the "Amendment is the
greatest issue which faces America today, greater than taxes or inflation or even Communist
infiltration." Id. at 104.
378. See Henkin, supra note 194, at 349 (observing that Bricker-type ideology infected
future treaty law).
379. Of course one could easily argue isolationist or unilateralist theories are themselves
fairly transparent covers for hostility to the values represented by international instruments-
racial equality, women's rights, socialism, etc. See Carolyn Cox Cohan, International
Mavericks: A Comparative Analysis of Selected Human Rights and Foreign Policy Issues in
Iran and the United States, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 197, 271 (2001) (asserting that United
States aversion to human rights treaties is attributable to "[m]odern America's fiercely
competitive capitalism, its disdain for comprehensive social welfare policies, and its thriving
and varied sectarian Protestant culture").
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it can persist in human rights violations.38 ° Much of the time, however, the
United States is compliant with the norms embodied in human rights
instruments that it refuses to sign or reserves on.38' What drives the
resistance to ratification and/or domestic application of human rights
treaties when the United States has every intention of conformity? Harold
Koh explains that the practice of complying but not signing allows the
United States to appear compliant with international law while vindicating
its national commitment to protect its legal institutions from the influence of
foreign bodies.382 Thus, while initially instrumental to preservation of racial
segregation, the anti-internationalist philosophy has taken on a life of its
own.
3. The Use of Pretextual and Non-Normative "Neutral" Values
While racial critiques have uncovered the overtly bigoted and antiforeign
agenda of the Brickerites, at the time of the proposed amendment, even
Senator Bricker set forth seemingly nonracial, nonisolationist "objective"
arguments in favor of his Amendment, grounded in states rights and balance
of power.383 Today, proponents of modern self-execution are often guarded
about revealing their aversions to law influenced by "un-American
foreigners. '3 4  Instead, they adopt Bricker's objectivist strategy of
advancing facially neutral structural arguments that the doctrine is
compelled by constitutional configuration.3 5 When one peels away the
artifice of these constitutional arguments, however, it is easy to see the
isolationist ideal at work. Moreover, examining these proponents'
philosophies as a whole reveals a basic hostility to international law.
380. See supra notes 26-38 and accompanying text (discussing the President's violation of
international law).
381. See Koh, supra note 23, at 1484 (asserting that the United States has adopted "the
perverse practice of human rights compliance without ratification").
382. Id. at 1484-85. He opines, "[T]he United States tries to have it both ways. On the one
hand, it enjoys the appearance of compliance. On the other, it maintains the illusion of
unfettered sovereignty." Id. at 1485.
383. See Golove, supra note 357, at 585 (asserting that Bricker's arguments involved
federalism and separation of powers concerns); Richards, supra note 374, at 180 ("Holman and
Bricker believed that a massive gap in the Constitution needed filling before a small group of
internationalists ... pilfered America's valued freedoms.").
384. See infra notes 443-45 and accompanying text (noting John Yoo's resistance to being
termed "isolationist").
385. Judith Resnick observes, "The arguments ... are remarkably congruent over time: that
transnational human rights conventions threaten American sovereignty, states' prerogatives, and
the domestic order established therein." Judith Resnick, Law's Migration: American
Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J.
1564, 1606 (2006).
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One of the principal arguments against giving treaties domestic effect
advanced both by Bricker and scholars today is federalism.386 The federalist
argument asserts that treaties should be presumptively non-self-executing in
order to preserve state rights or presumptively invalid in areas of state
control.387 Federalists hold that Congress can only execute a treaty if it has
independent legislative authority in the subject area of the treaty.388 This
argument was put to rest over one hundred years ago in Missouri v.
Holland, 389 when the Supreme Court held ratified treaties effective, even if
touching on an area of exclusive state prerogative.
390
One should not be surprised at the use of federalism to counter human
rights treaties given that federalism is often espoused to defeat civil rights
laws, and federalism concerns typically mask larger political conservatism,
as in Bricker's case.39' In fact, some argue that federalism was forged into
the Constitution particularly to support the continuation of slavery.3 92 One
such critical scholar asserts that "jurisdictional divides (local versus
national, domestic versus international)" have always served as "the bases
for refusing to alter status regimes. 393 In the treaty context, "America's
standoffishness from the twentieth-century international human rights
movement is rooted in protection of local as well as national prerogatives to
set the standards of interpersonal hierarchies. 394 Thus, to some scholars,
federalism is "a stance that has been deployed throughout America's history
to deflect transnational efforts to enhance the equality and dignity of human
beings."'3 95
386. See infra notes 387-88 and accompanying text (explaining Brickerites' federalism
arguments). Curtis Bradley sets forth a very qualified defense of federalism, endeavoring to
"simply" show that "if federalism is to be the subject of judicial protection .. .there is no
justification for giving the treaty power special immunity from such protection." Curtis A.
Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism, 97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 394 (1998).
387. See Yoo, Treaties, supra note 170, at 2238-39 (arguing that treaties should be non-
self-executing to avoid rendering treaty power "an unlimited authority to legislate on any
subject").
388. Bradley, supra note 386, at 412-13.
389. 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
390. Id. at 434-35.
391. See Golove, supra note 357, at 585 (observing that those lodging antitreaty federalism
arguments "principally had racial segregation in mind").
392. See, e.g., Resnick, supra note 385, at 1578 ("[A] specific premise of the American
constitutional agreement to 'split the atom of power' was that it enabled slavery to survive, if
not flourish. States claimed a sovereign prerogative to determine which persons were
recognized as legally entitled to the sanctity of their own bodies and the fruits of their own
labors.").
393. Id. at 1578-79.
394. Id. at 1579.
395. Id. at 1584.
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Perhaps, however, federalism is not completely instrumental and there is
a core value lurking in these arguments.396 Federalists would certainly say
the value is "states rights"-in this context, the right to be free from
international obligations imposed by the federal government.3 97 The
problem is that our constitutional structure forecloses the argument that
states have such a "right." '398 As a nation, there are certain things upon
which we must all speak with one voice. Under the Constitution, treaty law
is such a thing.3 99 There is ample historical support that one of the primary
reasons the framers added treaties to the Supremacy Clause was to prevent
states from undermining the Unites States' international obligations.4"'
Treaty supremacy was part of the principle that the United States was a
single nation, rather than a loose collection of sovereigns.40 ' Consequently,
were states to retain such a "right," the federal government simply could not
396. See Duncan B. Hollis, Executive Federalism: Forging New Federalist Constraints on
the Treaty Power, 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 1327, 1333-52 (2006) (outlining several points of debate
that federalists make against treaty power including, textualism, originalism, structure and
"prudence").
397. Of course, one may question whether a state having a "right" is normatively
meaningful at all. See generally Ann Althouse, Why Talking About "States' Rights" Cannot
Avoid the Need for Normative Federalism Analysis: A Response to Professors Baker and
Young, 51 DUKE L.J. 363, (2001) (concluding that "there is no escape from the normative
question: Will the state autonomy do more harm than good?"); cf Kathleen M. Sullivan, From
States' Rights Blues to Blue States' Rights: Federalism After the Rehnquist Court, 75 FORDHAM
L. REV. 799, 809-10 (2006) (offering several theoretical foundations of federalism); Ernest A.
Young, The Conservative Case for Federalism, 74 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 874 (2006)
(expounding on instrumental virtues of federalism, including furthering civil rights).
398. See David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical Foundations of
the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1095 n.52 (2000)
(noting that states do not have power to negotiate treaties).
399. Jordan J. Paust discusses an important report to the Congress by John Jay, Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, the year before the Constitutional Conventions. See Paust, supra note 13, at
761. Jay argued that treaties should be binding on the whole of the nation and "'independent of
the will and power of' state legislatures." Id. (quoted in C. BUTLER, THE TREATY-MAKING
POWER OF THE UNITED STATES 268 n.4 (1902)); See also Golove, supra note 357, at 603
(observing that "the Constitution delegates [treaty] power exclusively to the federal
government").
400. See supra note 326 (discussing the framers' desire to bind states to treaties); see also
Thomas Michael McDonnell, Defensively Invoking Treaties in American Courts-Jurisdictional
Challenges Under the U.N. Drug Trafficking Convention by Foreign Defendants Kidnapped
Abroad by U.S. Agents, 37 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1401, 1415-16 (1996) (recounting history of
the Supremacy Clause and noting that even states' rights advocates recognized treaty supremacy
in order to avoid conflict with foreign states, establish uniform trade policy, and demonstrate
respect for universal rules of law).
401. Professor Golove asserts that the framers made treaties supreme because they "were
acutely aware of the need to present a united front to foreign states. The nation faced menacing
perils from abroad, making a common stand against foreign powers a matter of the most urgent
necessity." Golove, supra note 398, at 1091.
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be sovereign in the area of treaty making. Were Missouri v. Holland
decided differently, the United States could only carry out treaty
negotiations in "state" subject areas if states participated directly in treaty
ratification or the President obtained binding state assurances before any
treaty signing.
While federalism is the antitreaty mantra, its advocates do not explain
why it would be better to have states involved in treaty negotiations, as
opposed to state representatives conferring with the President over the
United States' collective international stances. There does not seem to be
any logical reason for this preference, save that the former course of action
impedes international law making. Moreover, states' rights advocates are
surely aware that states cannot negotiate treaties, meaning that no
international law could ever be made regarding "state" matters.4 °2 The
passion behind the federalism argument is a passion, not about nebulous
states' rights, but about the potential influence of international law.
Indeed, many federalism arguments are so heavily hedged that the
position boils down to-if federalism matters then treaties should not pre-
empt state law.4 °3 It is hard therefore to see what dog these federalists have
in the fight. When it comes down to brass tacks, however, and federalists
are forced to defend their position normatively, the defense tends to boil
down to an aversion to foreign values.4° For this reason, federalism
arguments have survived in the treaty context even though the expansion of
federal power via the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment
has rendered treaty-based federal power practically a moot issue.4 5
Consequently, even knowing that Congress has broad legislative ability,
self-proclaimed treaty federalists continue to support non-self-execution in
the hopes that Congress will not in fact legislatively implement treaties.
402. Id. at 1095 (asserting that the reversal of Holland would leave the United States in a
poor negotiating posture internationally because it would "be precluded from making treaties on
a range of potentially important subjects"); cf Edward T. Swaine, Does Federalism Constrain
the Treaty Power, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 403, 510 (2003) (proposing a system of hybrid treaty-
state compacts under the Constitution's Compact Clause).
403. See Bradley, supra note 386, at 461 (musing that "[plerhaps the increased
globalization and interdependence of nations renders federalism obsolete").
404. See, e.g., id. (asserting that federalism may be important because increased
internationalism may "actually increase the desire for local democracy and experimentation");
see also Barry Friedman, Federalism's Future in the Global Village, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1441,
1480 (1994) (predicting that aversion to foreign imposed standards will spur federalist revival).
405. Louis Henkin notes, "There is little that is not 'within the jurisdiction of the United
States, i.e., within the treaty power, or within the legislative power of Congress under the
Commerce Power, under its authority to implement the Fourteenth Amendment, or under its
power to do what is necessary and proper to carry out its treaty obligations." Henkin, supra note
194, at 345.
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Their concern, therefore, is not about federal power over states, but about
foreign influence on the United States. 406
In addition, like Bricker, modem critics of self-execution argue that the
ability of treaty makers to create domestic law offsets the delicate balance
of power in our constitutional structure.4 °7 One of the most vocal
proponents of this argument is professor and former high level Bush
appointee John Yoo.40 8 He fervently asserts that allowing the President to
create domestic law through treaties with only the consent of the Senate
undermines the power of our democratically-elected House of
Representatives and gives too much power to the President.409 To be sure,
this argument is not simply one against self-execution, it is an argument
against treaty law all together. If treaties are by their very nature
antidemocratic, they are so whether they establish domestic law or only
bind the government to foreign obligations.410 Yoo and other conservatives'
concerns over balance of power, however, boil down to merely picking the
value that leads to one's conclusion. In other words, Yoo assumes that the
process by which treaties are made and ratified is "bad" and proposes a
system that is "better." The only difference one can readily ascertain from
the systems, however, is that in Yoo's proposed system it is harder to create
treaty law.
Yoo's primary critique of the treaty-making process is that it does not
involve bicameralism, his apparent touchstone for democracy. 41' He seems
to presume that the default structure must be congressional action and
executive veto, such that any deviation from this structure is presumptively
406. See id. at 346 (asserting that some see federalist position as "another sign that the
United States is resistant to international human rights agreements, setting up obstacles to their
implementation and refusing to treat human rights conventions as treaties dealing with a subject
of national interest").
407. See, e.g., Yoo, Treaties, supra note 170, at 2237 (asserting that "self-execution allows
the federal government to legislate without opposition from the textual checks on congressional
powers").
408. See id.
409. Yoo argues, "Non-self-execution ... better promotes democratic government in the
lawmaking process by requiring the consent of the most directly democratic part of the
government, the House of Representatives, before the nation can implement treaty obligations at
home." Id. at 2240. Then quizzically he states, "To be sure, the President provides a safeguard
against an anti-majoritarian treaty." Id. So what is the problem? The Senate?
410. See Henkin, supra note 194, at 346 (asserting that the democracy argument against
self-execution "impugns the democratic character of every treaty made").
411. Yoo, Treaties, supra note 170, at 2242 (criticizing the treaty making process for
"shift[ing] the center of policymaking from Congress to a President unencumbered by
bicameralism").
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invalid.41 2 It is quite clear, however, that our constitutional system is an
imperfect democracy, with various methods, both bicameral and unilateral,
for making law.4"3 The specific balance of power in the treaty context, as set
forth by the Constitution, is that the President may create treaty law, but
only with the approval of a supermajority of the Senate.4 14 As treaty scholar
Louis Henkin explains, "Whatever might be said for amending the
Constitution to require consent to a treaty by both Houses of Congress, that
is not what the Constitution (unamended) provides."4 5 Indeed if the
bicameral "default" system is so unquestionably preferable to the existing
treaty ratification system, one would think that Congress would have
amended the Constitution to so reflect when given the chance.416
Moreover, conservative scholars like Yoo tend to rely solely on the
characterization of treaty making as "undemocratic" to convince their
audiences to favor non-self-execution, without explaining why this
particular deviation from the bicameral "default" is so bad.41 7 Instead, they
often establish this point through dramatics, that is, predicting that treaty
law will take over the nation.4"8 Yoo, for example, warns ominously, "If the
United States forges multilateral agreements addressing problems that were
once domestic in scope, treaties could replace legislation as a vehicle for
domestic regulation., 4'9 Not only is the idea of treaty law subsuming every
412. See id. (asserting that it is a "distort[ion]" of democratic process to replace "parallel
House and Senate procedures for studying and adopting legislation, in which the President
exercises a final veto").
413. The President can unilaterally create law by way of executive order. Government
appointments require only Senate confirmation. Administrative agencies make binding rules.
414. See Paust, supra note 13, at 762 (recounting statement by antifederalist during
ratification recognizing that President had a "legislative" power through treaty making). Martin
S. Flaherty observes that "democracy concerns might cut against an overly monist approach to
domestic treaty enforcement. Yet, such concerns were precisely what the Founders rejected in
their formal commitment to self-executing treaties and associated doctrines." Martin S.
Flaherty, "External" Versus "Internal" in International Law, 29 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 447, 453
(2006).
415. Henkin, supra note 194, at 347.
416. See supra notes 360-82 and accompanying text (discussing Bricker amendment).
417. Yoo does describe the "open[ness]" of the bicameral process. Yoo, Treaties, supra
note 170, at 2241. Unless the Senate somehow closes its session or refuses to deal with interest
groups, however, it is hard to see why the treaty process is the equivalent of the type of
backdoor secretive politics that, ironically, the Bush Administration favors.
418. See Beth Stephens, Individuals Enforcing International Law: The Comparative and
Historical Context, 52 DEPAUL L. REV. 433, 434 (2002) (characterizing arguments that private
enforcement of international law will threaten balance of power among branches as "apocalyptic
claims").
419. Yoo, Treaties, supra note 170, at 2236; see Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Executing the
Treaty Power, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1867, 1893 (2005) (asserting that under internationalist
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area of domestic law unlikely as a matter of politics, it is practically
impossible given the last-in-time rule.42° If a treaty so gravely diverges from
the law Congress would have made, one could expect Congress to respond
quickly by passing legislation overriding the treaty.421 Professor Jed
Rubenfeld, however, ups the stakes by asserting that, according to some
internationalists, treaty law should be on the level of nearly immutable
Constitutional law, a principle at which even treaty defenders might balk.422
Yet all debate is a matter of degree. Of course, there will always be a
tension between guaranteed rights and incompatible "democratic"
legislation.423 Constitutional provisions cannot be overturned by legislation
precisely because they are a check on majoritarianism.424 We are
comfortable with that check on majority rule because constitutional law is
in other ways limited.425 This is the "balance" at which we have arrived,
although it is not purely democratic or majoritarian.426 The question, when it
comes to treaties, is not whether they are products of fully "democratic"
processes, but whether the slight deviation from bicameral structure is
warranted or defensible. This question can only be answered by balancing
the value of majoritarianism against the value of international law.427 Of
interpretations of treaty power "legislative powers are not merely somewhat expandable by
treaty; they are expandable virtually without limit").
420. See supra notes 313-14 and accompanying text (discussing last-in-time rule).
421. See Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (asserting that, under the
Constitution, treaties are on same footing as federal legislation).
422. Rubenfeld, supra note 345, at 2010.
423. This is often known as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty." See ALEXANDER M.
BICKEL, The LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17
(2d ed. Yale Univ. Press 1986) (1962).
424. The classic response, however, is that constitutional provisions are permitted to be a
check on majoritarianism because they are supermajoritarian. See Rubenfeld, supra note 345, at
2008 (noting that constitutional superiority over legislation renders constitutional provisions "of
special concern in democratic countries, demanding specially heightened forms of democratic
mobilization and participation if they are to claim legitimate authority"). However, one can
think of treaties as representing "world" majoritarianism.
425. Amendments are very difficult to pass, and constitutional jurisprudence is controlled
by various legal mechanisms like Supreme Court structure, language, stare decisis,
presumptions, logic, and more recently, originalism. One can certainly argue that this is not
much of a check. First, the original Bill of Rights, many argue, was a product of specific
political horse trading rather than democratic processes. Moreover, some see the various
controls on the Supreme Court to be little more than instruments for political ends. See supra
notes 395-406 (discussing federalism and instrumentalism).
426. See Damrosch, supra note 239, at 527 ("The Senate's power to withhold consent to
treaties is part of the Framers' carefully designed system of checks and balances.").
427. The "form over substance" tactic is a favor of legal positivists and conservative
theorists. They choose a default structure and illustrate through their own revisionist historical
accounts how this structure is the "true" constitutional structure. Liberal Supreme Court
decisions that deviate from the structure are criticized as anomalous or unwarranted and
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course, that balance is affected by how much one values majoritarianism
and international law, and how much majoritarianism or treaty power stands
to be sacrificed.4 28 The problem is that because many conservative scholars
employ structural arguments as a mask for an aversion to international law,
rather than balancing relative values, they rely on the mere fact that treaties
are not the product of "democracy" as the primary reason for their
rejection.4 29 As a result, the separation of powers argument reduces to little
more than a tricky way of defining treaty law as a priori illegitimate,
without having to admit that one does not value international law. One
expert notes that the "underlying notion" of such arguments "seems to be
that the United States is better off to the extent that the Constitution can be
made to limit and frustrate full United States' participation in the
burgeoning institutions and regimes of international society. 43°
Moreover, extending the relevant temporal span reveals that non-self-
execution tends to enlarge rather than contract executive power. A treaty
becomes law after negotiation among several parties and consent of the
President and a supermajority of the Senate. 431 Thereafter, the government is
bound by the treaty. The treaty, however, outlasts administrations, and a
future President may desire to violate the terms of the treaty. Non-self-
execution permits the President to unilaterally abrogate the treaty without
the check of judicial review. This is poignantly illustrated by the Bush
administration's position on the Geneva Conventions. 43 2 In 1949, the
President negotiated and ratified the Geneva Conventions, with the assent of
two-thirds of the Senate. Now, over fifty years later, the President has
decisions that adhere to that structure are glorified. See, e.g., Nelson Lund & John 0. McGinnis,
Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1571-72 (2004) (noting
homophobic undertones of Bowers but lauding opinion as the Court's decision to "sin no more"
and leave "existing due process precedents in place").
428. See Sloss, supra note 23, at 4 ("The doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, as
developed by the Supreme Court in the nineteenth century, struck an appropriate balance
between competing rule of law and separation of powers principles. However, the modem
doctrine of non-self-executing treaties, created by courts and commentators in the latter half of
the twentieth century, distorts that balance.").
429. Professor Rubenfeld contrasts America's "democratic constitutionalism" with
Europe's "international constitutionalism" and concludes that broad treaty power conflicts with
America's self-perception as a democratic institution. Rubenfeld, supra note 345, at 2000-13.
However, the question that must be answered is what is the overriding value of this defense of
democracy in the face of the associated costs to international relations and human rights. See
supra note 427 (discussing problem of elevating form over substance in constitutional law).
430. Golove, supra note 398, at 1314.
431. See supra notes 407-17 (describing this "nondemocratic" system).
432. See supra notes 26-41 and accompanying text (discussing Bush's position on Geneva
Conventions).
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decided alone that he is not bound by the Geneva Conventions' dictates.433
Were the Geneva Conventions presumptively self-executing, the President
would have to either negotiate a new treaty and get Senate approval or
convince Congress to pass rescinding legislation.434 Instead, the President
acted unilaterally in violation of Geneva and relied on the self-execution
doctrine to make his actions immune from judicial scrutiny.435
Consequently, in the war on terror, the self-execution doctrine has enhanced
executive power and minimized Congress's role.
The above analysis may explain why the most fervent supporters of non-
self-execution are elsewhere the greatest advocates of unfettered executive
discretion in foreign affairs. It is extremely difficult to accept that
conservative critics of self-execution are really concerned about executive
power or bicameral procedure in the abstract.436 Yoo, who elsewhere argues
that the President possesses the sole discretion to interpret treaties,437 may
act in the prosecution of the war on terror without "democratic"
congressional approval, 438 and may engage in torture in violation of
international law,439 appears patently hypocritical when he states in the
treaty context, "As a matter of accountability, when the government
imposes rules of conduct on individuals, those rules ought to be made by
members of the legislature who directly represent the people."
440
To be sure, these formalist conservative scholars take offense at any
attempt to deconstruct their structural arguments. Yoo, for example, decries
such criticism as nonacademic personal attack:
433. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
434. Of course, Congress ended up passing legislation, but only after the Supreme Court
constrained the President's actions through statutory interpretation. See supra notes 80-85 and
accompanying text.
435. See supra notes 26-29 and accompanying text (examining Bush's stance on executive
unilateralism).
436. Indeed, Yoo, one of the foremost proponents of state secrecy, takes the amazing
position that because treaties no longer largely involve sensitive foreign matters, there is no
reason that they should be kept in "secrecy" from Congress during negotiation and ratification.
Yoo, Treaties, supra note 170, at 2241.
437. See Ku & Yoo, supra note 168, at 180 (criticizing Hamdan opinion for its lack of
deference to the President's construction of Geneva); Yoo, supra note 159, at 106 (criticizing
Hamdan for rejecting "usual judicial deference to presidential interpretation of treaties").
438. Yoo states, "Even if Congress had not authorized military commissions in the UCMJ,
President Bush would still have authority to establish them under his constitutional authority as
commander-in-chief." Yoo, supra note 164, at 97. He even compares Bush's unilateral actions
in setting up Guantinamo bay to Abraham Lincoln freeing the slaves and Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's making the United States an "arsenal of democracy." Id. at 83.
439. See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text (discussing "torture memos" authored
in part by Yoo, which advise President Bush that he has authority to violate Geneva).
440. Yoo, Treaties, supra note 170, at 2240.
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The foreign relations law community seems to have a tendency to
accept certain conclusions of law with the slightest of scrutiny.
Sometimes utter unanimity surrounds certain conclusions, such as
... whether treaties should be self-executing, with a minimum of
debate. When those propositions are later challenged by sincere
intellectual criticism, the international law community often
responds by claiming that these conclusions are motivated either
by "isolationism" or by an almost senseless desire to roil what are
peaceful waters, rather than by engaging the arguments on the
merits.44'
There is, however, a trick to Yoo's arguments. Addressing his claims "on
the merits" means playing with a stacked deck where bicameralism is a
default and treaty law will always lose." 2 Engaging the liberal legal forms,
what Yoo characterizes as the only legitimate way to debate, is to forfeit the
debate. The deeper issues involve, not how to play the game, but why the
deck should be stacked in such a manner.
It is difficult to ignore the isolationist beliefs of non-self-execution
proponents when they lie so close to the surface. Yoo, for example, has not
made his distaste for foreign law and international actors a secret.44' He
decries the influence of international law as heralding "the emergence of
what can be called a deterritorialized, 'cosmopolitan' moral sensibility,
generally shared by governing elites of the advanced nations. ' 4" Moreover,
Yoo criticizes the increasing awareness of contemporary European law by
stating:
Europe has been given to fluctuations of ideological extremes....
In the Twentieth Century, monarchy was followed by fascism,
socialism, and communism. As history has demonstrated, the
performance of these regimes has been less than exemplary. In
particular, fascism and communism, which were once viewed by
441. Id. at 2258.
442. Flaherty and Vdzquez do engage the forms by seeking to demonstrate that Yoo's
account of history is flawed. See generally Flaherty, supra note 324 (arguing that "careful
examination of the self-execution assumption only confirms it"); Carlos Manuel Vdzquez,
Laughing at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154 (1999) (arguing that "constitutional texts,
doctrine, and structure-to say nothing of the Founders' intent-rule out Yoo's claim"). Even
then, however, Yoo responds that his revisionism is not simply instrumental to defeating
international law, it is part of the "structure" of academic debate. He states, "Revisionism,
particularly the constant re-evaluation of the correctness of scholarly consensus, can only be
healthy for the study of law." Yoo, Treaties, supra note 170, at 2258.
443. See Robert J. Delahunty & John Yoo, Against Foreign Law, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 291, 326 (2005).
444. Id. at 330.
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some as advanced, modem ideologies, were adopted by regimes
that murdered millions. 45
Consequently, the appeal to formalist "neutral" values does not succeed
in divesting the modem self-execution doctrine of its isolationist character.
Therefore, the Supreme Court's choice to avoid the self-execution issue
because of a belief in the validity of this doctrine is, at its core, an




Internationalists and civil libertarians have widely praised Hamdi and
Hamdan for creating a new era of rights, and at least one commentator has
stated that the MCA, following Hamdan, "put the final nail in the coffin" of
unbridled executive discretion.447 Yet reports of the demise of executive
overreaching and American isolationism are greatly exaggerated. To this
day, the Guantdnamo detentions continue, and the United States remains a
consistent subject of criticism from international actors, the press, and the
public. A finding that the Geneva Conventions are self-executing, in
addition to possibly affording real and effective relief to detainees who
continue to be treated in inhumane ways, would truly set the United States
on a path toward reversing the sad history of the last six years. It would
permit the United States to step out of the dark era of Bricker, racism, and
isolation into a new light of taking international law seriously. Holding the
Geneva Conventions self-executing could demonstrate that the United
States is a country of laws that can proudly occupy the position of a global
defender of human rights.
Unfortunately, although the Supreme Court was well poised to take up
the issue of treaty self-execution, it did not do so, evidencing an unfortunate
445. Id. at 326. Similarly Professor, John McGinnis is a critic of incorporation of
international and foreign law into constitutional law on democracy grounds. Professor
McGinnis accepts the argument, however, that a "justice-seeking view of the Constitution
accepts many nondemocratic sources of law, like moral theory, or efficiency considerations."
John 0. McGinnis, Foreign to Our Constitution, 100 Nw. U. L. REV. 303, 317 (2006). The
difference with treaty law, however, is that these other "nondemocratic" sources of law have
redeeming value, whereas international law has none. He states, "The difficulty for international
law is that nothing about its process of generation should lead us to believe that it should be
used as a trumping factor over our own domestic processes, nor is there anything about
international or indeed foreign law that should make us consider it intrinsically good." Id. at
317-18.
446. See generally Ginsburg, supra note 7 (discussing the changing Court).
447. Katyal, supra note 58, at 70.
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internalization of treaty law fear created by lower court activism and
conservative scholarship. This fear is neither justified by the Supreme
Courts' own history nor compelled by the structure of the Constitution.
Because the modem self-execution doctrine, particularly the intent analysis,
is essentially isolationist, the Court can only be truly internationalist when it
finally puts an end to recent treaty law hostility. Consequently, now is not
the time for civil libertarians and internationalists to be complacent. They
must be vigilant in their advocacy of the rule of law and judicial review. If
the Supreme Court is willing to once again exercise jurisdiction over cases
like Hamdan, it may well have the opportunity to assess whether the
procedures set forth in the MCA violate the Geneva Conventions. This time,
the Court will not be able to avoid the issue of self-execution by relying on
congressional intent. Thus, internationalists and civil libertarians yet have a
role to play in urging the Supreme Court to be an international team player
rather than a "lone ranger."

